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Compounding the Countermajoritarian Difficulty 
Through “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy”: Can the 
International Criminal Court Provide a Solution? 
In the past twenty-five years the United States 
has had three major exports: rock music, blue 
jeans, and United States law. The first two 
have acquired an acceptance the last can never 
achieve. People resent being told what to do. 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
The eighteen judges of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
each elected by a two-thirds majority of states parties to the ICC,2 
took their oath of office in The Hague on March 11, 2003.3 These 
judges then selected by absolute majority4 one of their own—
Philippe Kirsch, a distinguished Canadian jurist5—to serve a three-
year term as President of the ICC. No two judges may be nationals 
of the same state,6 but no judge is a national of the United States. It 
is true that on December 31, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the 
 1. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. ICC, at art. 36(6)(a), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3. Keith B. Richburg, International War Crimes Court Is Inaugurated, but Without 
U.S., WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
ac2/wp-dyn/A12630-2003Mar11. 
 4. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 38(1) (“The President and the First and Second 
Vice-Presidents shall be elected by an absolute majority of the judges. They shall each serve for 
a term of three years or until the end of their respective [nine year, nonrenewable] terms of 
office as judges, whichever expires earlier. They shall be eligible for re-election once.”). 
 5. Marlise Simons, World Court for Crimes of War Opens in The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 2003, at A10 (reporting the inauguration of the body of judges and their subsequent 
selection according to Article 38(1) of the ICC Statute of Philippe Kirsch, a Canadian judge 
and specialist on international law, as President and Akua Kuenehia of Ghana and Elizabeth 
Odio Benito of Costa Rica as Vice-Presidents). 
 6. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 36(7)(a). 
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final draft of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC 
Statute or Rome Statute), adopted at the Rome Conference of July 
17, 1998, despite “concerns about significant flaws in the Treaty.”7 
But he did this so that the United States would remain “in a position 
to influence the evolution of the Court.”8 This controversial move 
did not invite U.S. support of the ICC in the end. 
To the contrary, the United States has wholly rejected the ICC 
in the three years since President Clinton signed the final draft ICC 
Statute. In doing so, the United States has argued both that U.S. 
participation in the ICC would violate the U.S. Constitution and 
that U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world would subject the United 
States to politically motivated prosecutions in the ICC arising out of 
U.S. peacekeeping activities. The constitutional concerns 
surrounding U.S. participation in the ICC focus largely on 
jurisdictional considerations and on vague or ambiguous language in 
the ICC Statute’s definition of jurisdiction-conferring crimes.  
But such arguments alone neither necessarily render U.S. 
participation in the ICC unconstitutional nor even seem to 
constitute the true U.S. objection to the ICC. Rather, these 
arguments may stem from a more fundamental concern inherent in 
the ICC’s institutional nature: the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
That is, the ICC’s substantive authority over the citizens of the states 
parties independent of these states’ duly elected governments seems 
undemocratic. Such facial countermajoritarianism, however, does not 
automatically violate U.S. constitutional principles, as the United 
States’ own experience with the countermajoritarian difficulty has 
shown. In the end analysis, U.S. rejection of the ICC may stem more 
pragmatically from entrenched U.S. perspectives on the force of 
international law and simple U.S. mistrust of the political motives of 
some states parties to the ICC. Rejecting the ICC on these grounds 
reciprocally invites scrutiny of the U.S. posture toward the rest of the 
world—both through reliance on the principles of international law 
and through the use of international law to achieve political 
objectives—in civil litigation under the Alien Tort Statute, a long-
idle provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
 7. Bill Clinton, Statement by the President, Signature of the International Criminal 
Court, in Clinton Announces U.S. Is Signing International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 
2000), http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/00123101.htm. 
 8. Id. 
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A. Background: Confronting a Disturbing Asymmetry in U.S. Law 
The same “concerns” to which President Clinton alluded in 
2000 had already led to vehement objections to the ICC in Senate 
hearings on July 23, 1998. Senator Rod Grams declared, “I hope 
that now the administration will actively oppose this Court to make 
sure that it shares the same fate as the League of Nations and 
collapses without U.S. support[,] for this court truly I believe is the 
monster and it is the monster that we need to slay.”9 Subsequently, 
despite Clinton’s signature on the ICC Statute, the United States 
under the Bush Administration abstained from becoming a party to 
the treaty just months before the ICC Statute came into effect on 
July 1, 2002.10 In fact, concerns over the ICC’s jurisdictional reach, 
prosecutorial responsibilities, and the definitions of crimes in the 
ICC Statute convinced the Bush Administration to insist on “a 100 
percent ironclad guarantee that no American servicemen will be 
investigated and prosecuted by the court.”11 On July 13, 2002, after 
diplomatically tense weeks of U.S. threats to pull its support from 
U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world unless U.S. troops 
obtained immunity from prosecution in the ICC, the U.N. Security 
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1422 granting the U.S. 
military immunity for a one-year period.12 The United States then 
began seeking bilateral agreements with individual governments to 
exempt U.S. military personnel from ICC prosecution.13 
Additionally, “statements made by U.S. representatives reveal that 
 9. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the National Interest?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 4 (1998) 
[hereinafter ICC Hearings (1998)] (statement of Sen. Rod Grams). 
 10. Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, entitled “International Criminal 
Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan” (May 6, 2002), at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968pf.htm (“This is to inform you, in 
connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 
1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the 
United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000.”). 
 11. Glenn Kessler, Concerns over War Crimes Court Not New, WASH. POST, July 2, 
2002, at A9, available at 2002 WL 22785191 (quoting Richard Dicker, director of Human 
Rights Watch). 
 12. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1422 (2002); Serge Schmemann, U.S. Peacekeepers Given Year’s Immunity from New 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3; Colum Lynch, U.S. Wins 1-Year Shield from War 
Crimes Court, WASH. POST, July 13, 2002, at A16, available at 2002 WL 23853232. 
 13. Uncle Sam Lays Down the Law, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 49. 
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Resolution 1422 was an obvious step toward thwarting the ICC’s 
powers,”14 a step consistent with Senator Grams’s hope that U.S. 
rejection of the ICC would send that body the way of the League of 
Nations. 
But invoking the fate of the League of Nations—although, as 
envisioned by Woodrow Wilson, it undoubtedly had its 
weaknesses15—by inviting the demise of the ICC seems dangerous in 
today’s world of globalization, and may lead to undesired or 
unforeseen results.16 That is, the inability of the western democracies 
to cede some sovereignty to the League of Nations after World War 
I in the interest of peace created a divisiveness exploited by Hitler in 
his quest for domination. This resulted in an unfortunate irony, as 
one astute observer noted as early as 1939: “Woodrow Wilson tried 
to unite the postwar world in an idealism for which it was not yet 
ripe. It would be the height of paradox if Hitler, of all persons, were 
destined by his statesmanship finally ‘to make the world safe for 
Democracy.’”17 The irrelevancy of the League of Nations taught the 
 14. Mohamed El Zeidy, The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the 
ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1503, 1507 (2002) (arguing for rejection of Resolution 1422 on the grounds 
that it contradicts the United Nations Charter and the Law of Treaties and violates certain 
preemptory norms). 
 15. See generally Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles 
Settlement, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99 (1994) (assessing the values and weaknesses of 
Wilsonian self-determination and its continued effects and implications in the post–cold war 
world). 
16. See ROBERT S. MCNAMARA & JAMES G. BLIGHT, WILSON’S GHOST: REDUCING 
THE RISK OF CONFLICT, KILLING, AND CATASTROPHE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 59 (2001) 
(highlighting current “[p]ublic opinion in the United States and the West [which] dangerously 
fails to appreciate the possibility of a Great Power clash and/or to make plans to prevent it”). 
Much like Senator Trent Lott’s gaffe at Senator Strom Thurmond’s 100th birthday party, in 
which he appeared to condone Thurmond’s segregationist platform as a presidential candidate 
in 1948 for the Dixiecrat Party, current citation to the precedent of the American torpedoing 
of the League of Nations in justifying rejection of the ICC risks identification with some of the 
socially unacceptable and discriminatory reasons that the United States declined joining the 
League in 1919. For example, in the debates concerning the Permanent Court of International 
Justice under the proposed League of Nations, a senator from Missouri objected to U.S. 
participation in the Court or League stating, “‘Think of submitting questions involving the 
very life of the United States to a tribunal on which a nigger from Liberia, a nigger from 
Honduras, [and] a nigger from India . . . each have votes equal to that of the great United 
States.’” David P. Forsythe, The United States and International Criminal Justice, 24 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 974, 990 n.47 (2002) (quoting PAUL GORDON LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: 
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 113 (1988)). 
 17. C., Will Hitler Save Democracy?, 17 FOREIGN AFF. 455, 464 (April 1939) 
(observing that “Hitler’s crudeness . . . has ended by creating . . . what Bismarck always most 
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world about the necessity of the post–World War II United Nations 
the hard way—through Hitler. And “a future Adolf Hitler may point 
to the U.S. action [in not joining the ICC] in telling his followers 
that they need not fear being held accountable.”18 But of more 
immediate concern, perhaps, than abstractly sending a mixed 
message to human rights violators, is that U.S. hopes of impairing 
the ICC like the League of Nations create a problematic asymmetry 
in the American legal relationship with the rest of the world. 
True, legitimate concerns about the ICC Statute led to the U.S. 
rejection of the ICC. Certain flaws in the ICC Statute might 
constitute a threat to U.S. national interests.19 In general, U.S. 
opponents to the ICC believe that the ICC Statute “created a court 
with [1] hitherto unprecedented jurisdictional reach and with [2] 
substantive authority to adjudicate a long list of crimes previously 
unknown in the established canon of customary international law.”20 
These two overarching concerns with the ICC refer, on the one 
hand, to the “de facto universal jurisdiction which emerged from the 
treaty,”21 and on the other, to the perceived failure of the ICC’s 
definitions of crimes “to give adequate notice of exactly what they 
prohibit under the [U.S.] ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine.”22 Ironically, 
then, in light of the U.S. opposition to the ICC’s universal 
jurisdiction and its definitions of crimes, the U.S. Alien Tort Claims 
Act (ATCA)23 allows aliens to sue foreign defendants in U.S. courts 
for certain crimes committed abroad amounting to violations of 
feared: an almost universal anti-German coalition”). Ironically, having rejected the peaceful 
way to a union of democratic nations, the world’s democracies were forced to achieve such a 
union through the horrors of another world war fought “to defend the principles of freedom 
which make individual lives worth living.” Id. 
 18. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 74 (prepared statement of Michael P. Scharf, 
Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Law and Policy, New England School 
of Law, Boston, MA) (arguing that “the U.S. may have lost far more than it gained by voting 
against the ICC Statute”). 
 19. Id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms). 
 20. Richard G. Wilkins, The Right Thing the Wrong Way: Implications of the New 
International Criminal Court, WORLD & I, Oct. 2002, at 265, 268. 
 21. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer, 
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes issues). 
 22. Id. at 59 (prepared statement of Hon. John R. Bolton, Former Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organization Affairs; Senior Vice President, American Enterprise 
Institute, Washington, D.C.). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Hailing originally from 1789, the Alien Tort Statute now 
reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. 
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customary international law—a list of crimes substantially similar to 
the three crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute—precisely under the 
idea of universal jurisdiction.24 Essentially, as the world’s sole 
superpower, the United States has created “supercourts”25 that 
employ universal jurisdiction, dubbed federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, to judge citizens of countries that have not subjected 
themselves to U.S. law.26 This trend has exacerbated a perception of 
legal asymmetry from the perspective of other countries: 
The juxtaposition of this increased involvement of U.S. courts in 
foreign affairs with the continued American refusal to participate in 
bodies like the International Criminal Court creates the image of a 
country happy to haul foreign defendants into its own courts while 
stubbornly resisting even the remote possibility that its own citizens 
might be called to account [in the ICC].27
In short, U.S. courts administer the rule of law against foreign 
defendants for these crimes, but the United States does not trust the 
ICC because judges from places like “Sudan or . . . Iran”28 may do 
the same. 
B. Assuaging the Asymmetry 
Not only U.S. foreign policy suffers from ATCA litigation; 
rather, just as the admitted flaws in the ICC Statute constitute 
possible constitutional obstacles,29 ATCA suits raise constitutional 
 24. Beth Stephens, Expanding Remedies for Human Rights Abuses: Civil Litigation in 
Domestic Courts, 40 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 117, 135 (1997) (outlining and applauding U.S. 
courts’ application of the ATCA since 1980 as a means of combating human rights abuses). 
 25. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 115. 
 26. Cf. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 7 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) 
(criticizing the ICC because “this court declared that the American people are under its 
jurisdiction no matter what the U.S. government says or does about it”). 
 27. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 115. 
 28. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 3 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams). 
 29. For a discussion of the constitutional obstacles decried by the United States in the 
ICC Statute, see Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the 
International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 382 (2002) (detailing the various 
constitutional concerns surrounding the ICC statute, including “prosecutorial power, 
immunity, rights of the accused, fugitive transfer, and imprisonment,” and showing that these 
“obstacles . . . may be surmountable, but not without significant political will to ratify”). Even 
those countries that support and thus have ratified the ICC face constitutional questions in 
conjunction with the operation of the court. See generally Helen Duffy, National 
Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & 
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concerns of their own. Particularly, the “plaintiff’s diplomacy”30 
resulting from ATCA litigation infringes on separation of powers 
principles, not only between the judicial and executive branches 
within the U.S. governmental system, but also, strikingly, between 
U.S. courts and the legislative prerogatives of other countries.31 In 
this sense, ATCA litigation actually compounds the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty”32 already heavily scrutinized in U.S. 
INT’L L. 5, 6, 8 (2001). Duffy identifies three overarching constitutional issues in ratifying 
countries: (1) “the compatibility of a state’s constitutional prohibition on the extradition of its 
nationals with the absolute obligation on state parties to the Rome Statute to arrest and 
surrender suspects to the Court”; (2) “the consistency of constitutional immunities, such as 
those conferred on heads of states or parliamentarians, with the duty imposed on state parties 
to arrest and surrender suspects, irrespective of their official status”; and (3) “the compatibility 
of constitutional prohibitions on life imprisonment with the Statute’s provisions on penalties, 
which allow the ICC to impose a life sentence in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 6. Duffy 
concludes that ratifying countries have generally divided themselves into two groups over these 
questions: those “that have decided to amend their constitutions to ensure that they are in line 
with the Rome Statute,” and those that simply “have concluded that their constitutional 
provisions are consistent with the Statute, and thus amendment is unnecessary.” Id. at 8. 
 30. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 103 (employing the term “plaintiff’s 
diplomacy” to describe the “new trend toward [ATCA] lawsuits that shape foreign policy” and 
grouping such suits by foreign plaintiffs in United States federal court into three broad 
categories: (1) “suits against individuals for grave violations of international law committed in 
the name of governments”; (2) “suits against corporations for violations of international law”; 
and (3) “suits against foreign governments . . . filed in an effort to achieve justice for victims of 
terrorism and oppression”). 
 31. Suits brought under the ATCA against corporations operating in foreign countries 
poignantly exemplify this phenomenon because in addition to “focus[ing] greater attention on 
the human rights and environmental implications of corporate investment,” judgments in U.S. 
courts in favor of alien plaintiffs “may produce . . . de facto sanctions against states with poor 
environmental and human rights records,” id. at 110, which in turn may “overturn” or 
“undermine” development policies of “governments of both developing and developed 
countries,” id. at 111. Cf. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 
1999) (expressing that U.S. federal courts should be wary of these suits’ potential for 
substituting U.S. policies for the policies of other governments); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 
F. Supp. 2d 534, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (following Beanal in recommending caution in 
these cases); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 519–520 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(exercising the caution that the Beanal court suggested in regard to situations where 
judgments might have the effect of substituting U.S. policy for the policy of another 
government in finding a lack of international consensus in customary international law as a 
basis for dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims). See infra Part III.B.3.b for treatment of the effect of 
ATCA suits against corporations. 
 32. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The root 
difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”); Barry 
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (defining the “countermajoritarian 
difficulty” as “the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and 
ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy”). 
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constitutional jurisprudence. That is, ATCA litigation 
internationalizes nonelected federal judges’ countermajoritarianism 
by extending it from intrusion into the policymaking responsibilities 
of the elected legislature or the executive branch within the United 
States to direction of political and social policy in other, usually 
developing, countries. But U.S. participation in the ICC—which will 
unavoidably also engage in judicial “legislation” on some public 
policy issues33—could assuage the tension in U.S. law between use of 
ATCA litigation and opposition to the ICC, a court built on 
remarkably similar principles to those underlying modern ATCA 
litigation. 
This Comment does not aim to give a comprehensive overview 
of minutia concerning the ICC. Numerous lengthier studies aptly 
treat the advantages34 and disadvantages35 of the ICC Statute. Rather, 
this Comment examines the compounded—internationalized—
counter-majoritarian difficulty of ATCA litigation’s “plaintiff’s 
diplomacy” in relation to the U.S. rejection of the ICC based in part 
on the ICC’s similar capacity for judicial legislation. 
First, Part II briefly defines the countermajoritarian difficulty for 
use in this framework. Part III spotlights civil litigation under the 
ATCA and its more current supplement, the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).36 Although the ATCA amounts to a 
rather “unusual statute”37 that “lay nearly dormant for 191 years,”38 
 33. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986 (discussing ICC opponents’ argument that “[s]ince 
the ICC will in effect ‘legislate’ on a variety of weighty issues, and since its prosecutor and 
judges will have the opportunity to overturn policy established by national democracies, the 
court should be opposed”). 
 34. See, e.g., Joshua Bardavid, The Failure of the State-Centric Model of International 
Law and the International Criminal Court, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 9 (2002); Michael P. Scharf, 
The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the 
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter 2001, at 67. An overwhelming number of articles support both sides of the issue, 
including, for example, the entire volume of 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001. 
 35. See, e.g., Marcus R. Mumford, Building upon a Foundation of Sand: A Commentary 
on the International Criminal Court Treaty Conference, 8 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 151 (1999); 
Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of 
Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the 
International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 391 (Fall/Winter 2001–
2002). 
 36. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)). 
 37. Stephens, supra note 24, at 122. 
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it is nevertheless “one of the most widely discussed provisions in 
modern international law.”39 As such, this Comment defers to the 
previous conscientious studies and criticisms40 of the U.S. use of the 
ATCA as a “human rights watchdog,”41 focusing more narrowly on 
the ATCA’s and the TVPA’s implications for the compounded 
countermajoritarian difficulty that renders America’s wholesale 
rejection of the ICC contradictory. 
Part IV investigates the roots of the ICC’s own 
countermajoritarian difficulty—its “democratic deficit”42 coupled 
 38. Ivan Poullaos, Note, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to 
Combat International Human Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 327 (2002) 
(investigating the expansion of ATCA litigation since 1980). 
 39. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the 
“Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 221 n.2 (1996) (providing a survey 
of numerous treatments of the ATCA up to 1996, and arguing that modern ATCA litigation 
expresses the original intent behind the statute). 
 40. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that “[i]t is important to remember that in 1789 there was no 
concept of international human rights”); Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J., 
June 17, 2003, at A16, available at http://www.aei.org/include/news_print.asp? 
newsID=17727 (“[I]t is clear not only that Filartiga [v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980), the leading ATCA case,] is wrong but that it is a serious incursion by courts into the 
domain of Congress, involving, as it does, the enactment of world-wide law by an unholy 
alliance of imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law professors.”); Jean-Marie 
Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (1993); Joseph 
Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995). 
 41. Cf. Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human 
Rights Watchdog or Simply Historical Trivia?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 341 (1988) 
(showing how the unclear origins of the ICC Statute in 1789 lead to uncertainty of the 
ATCA’s scope). 
 42. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986 (examining the “democratic deficit” of the ICC as a 
budding U.S. concern). Many international institutions face the criticism that a perceived 
democratic deficit inherent in their supra-national nature renders them illegitimate. See, e.g., 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 2, 
4–5. Nye argues that “governments can do several things to respond to the concerns about a 
global democratic deficit. First, they can try to design international institutions that preserve as 
much space as possible for domestic political processes to operate.” Id. at 4. Second, 
“[g]overnments should also make clear that democratic accountability can be quite indirect. 
Accountability is often assured through means other than voting, even in well-functioning 
democracies.” Id. at 5. Finally, “[i]ncreased transparency is also essential. . . . In some 
instances, such as judicial procedures or market interventions, it is unrealistic to provide 
information in advance, but records and justifications of decisions can later be disclosed for 
comment and criticism—as the Federal Reserve and the Supreme Court do in domestic 
politics.” Id. The European Union displays a marked example of a democratic deficit in 
international institutions. See, e.g., L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF 
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 3 (4th ed. 1994) (“[The Maastricht Treaty] 
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with its capacity for judicial legislation—through structural and 
prudential arguments arising out of the ICC’s institutional nature 
and its reliance on universal jurisdiction in administering justice. The 
ICC’s institutional newness entails risks, including the possibility of 
ceding some sovereignty to participate in the court, but “a state may 
consent to limitations on its sovereignty”;43 indeed, the United States 
has excelled in “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty.”44 Moreover, 
current U.S. use of legal principles such as universal jurisdiction and 
the substance of customary international law as a basis for the 
expansion of ATCA litigation and as a justification for enacting the 
TVPA lessens the validity of these issues as prohibitive constitutional 
risks of participation in the ICC. Instead, the truly difficult 
constitutional concern arising out of the ICC relates to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty: the institutional nature of the ICC will 
allow it to pass judgment on, and so in a certain sense to direct, 
domestic public policy relating to the three crimes under its 
jurisdiction. 
Finally, Part V notes that with some effort, U.S. ratification of 
the Statute could provide a (constitutional) solution, allowing the 
United States to continue using the ATCA in civil suits without 
eliciting the disdain of a world all too eager to mistakenly equate 
U.S. hegemony with empire building.45 Rather than subjecting the 
world to a de facto universal law in the form of U.S. federal subject 
matter jurisdiction to the exclusion of the ICC, a participatory 
international panel, U.S. ATCA litigation could simply provide civil 
remedies for criminal offenses authoritatively tried in the ICC. But 
Part V concludes that because the United States “remains mired in 
enhances the powers of the European Parliament to help meet the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’ within the Community.”). 
 43. Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 401 (citing John Marshall’s opinion in Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (noting that states can consent to 
limit their sovereignty)). 
 44. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 45. On views of America as a type of neo–Roman Empire, see G. John Ikenberry, 
America’s Imperial Ambition, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 44; Allister Sparks et al., 
How the World Views America, WILSON Q., Spring 2001, at 46 (a collection of seven articles 
by seven authors from around the world addressing this question and finding largely that 
America deserves the designation of empire). For an explanation of why accusations of 
American empire building are misguided, see Martin Walker et al., An American Empire?, 
WILSON Q., Summer 2002, at 35 (essays by five scholars refuting the comparison between 
America and Rome and exposing the fallacy in identifying America with other past empires). 
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history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where 
international laws and rules are unreliable,”46 the ICC’s capacity for 
judicial legislation will continue to dissuade the United States from 
joining the ICC, at least until the ICC establishes itself. 
II. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY IN THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
A. From Judicial Review to the “Countermajoritarian Difficulty” 
Ever since Marbury v. Madison47 the concept of judicial review 
has thrived in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. But the fact that 
unelected judges can override legislation created by elected 
representatives of the people seems undemocratic, even 
antidemocratic; in short, as Alexander Bickel notes, “judicial review 
is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”48 However, Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 “denied . . . that judicial review 
constituted control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected 
majority.”49 This conclusion “only supposes that the power of the 
people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature 
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people 
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the 
latter, rather than the former.”50 But even the highly valued stability 
that this ensures is “a countermajoritarian factor”51 because in 
upholding the Constitution against an inconsistent current legislative 
enactment “it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people 
of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the 
 46. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER 3 (2003). President George W. Bush confirmed this feeling following the 
deadlock among the permanent members of the Security Council over how best to disarm Iraq 
in the months preceding the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 in his verdict that “[t]he 
United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.” 
President George W. Bush, Speech Delivering Ultimatum to Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2003/03/17/iraq/main544377.shtml (issuing a 48-hour 
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq or face “military conflict commenced 
at a time of our choosing”). 
 47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 48. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 16. 
 49. Id.  
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1982). 
 51. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 17. 
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prevailing majority, but against it.”52 In short, the power of 
appointed justices not directly accountable to the voting public—
such as those on the U.S. Supreme Court—over the elected 
legislature through judicial review renders the resulting de facto 
creation of political and social policy undemocratic. 
And yet the United States is also wary of a politicized judiciary. 
“We disdain the notion of judges rendering decisions under the 
threat of political retribution,”53 which threat can arise in the case of 
elected judges. Similarly, in the case of appointed judges, “[w]e 
expect that judges will decide cases based on the facts and existing 
precedents, rather than on the preferences of those in power.”54 
These two concerns express America’s priority on the rule of law free 
from politics, perhaps even over the criticism that appointed justices 
are an unelected minority with power over the elected representatives 
of the majority. To divorce politics from federal adjudication, the 
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, in part through 
life tenure.55 A sufficiently independent judiciary allows courts to 
decide according to reasoned principle, a role they are institutionally 
uniquely suited to perform. “When we speak of the rule of law—at 
home and abroad—this [adjudication free from political pressure] is 
in large part what we mean.”56 Allowing an independent judiciary to 
administer the rule of law in a system of horizontal separation of 
powers provides an essential check on legislative and executive 
power; judicial review facilitates the judiciary’s designated role in the 
U.S. system of checks and balances. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part IV: Law’s 
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 972 (2000). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“Article III’s tenure and salary guarantees for federal judges are the 
constitutional embodiment of this value of judicial independence from political pressure.”). 
But others have argued the opposite: that the lifetime tenure of federal judges can compromise 
the independent judiciary. See, e.g, L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 77–79 (William Eskridge & 
Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (arguing that a solution to the way that lifetime tenure detracts 
from the independence of the judiciary “is a non-renewable eighteen-year term . . . with 
vacancies occurring every two years” because “[t]he turnover would remain roughly the 
previous average (2.2 years) but would be less random”). 
 56. Friedman, supra note 53, at 972–73. 
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B. “[N]either Force nor Will, but [M]erely [J]udgment”57
Because each branch of the U.S. government represents the 
interest of the people, the countermajoritarian nature of the federal 
judiciary in providing an essential check on the other branches must 
not necessarily constitute a difficulty for the U.S. democratic system. 
True, “judicial review is a deviant institution in the American 
democracy”58 when compared to the actions of legislators and the 
executive whom the people elect directly, but that does not 
necessarily detract from the republican nature of American 
democracy or implicate a “crisis of legitimacy”59 for judicial review. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the independent judiciary could 
fulfill its constitutional role as “an intermediate body between the 
people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority”60 without Justice 
Marshall’s ingenious solution to the deadlock in Marbury v. 
Madison: formalized judicial review. 
Furthermore, the fact that the people do not directly elect federal 
judges does not automatically de-legitimize judicial review; rather, it 
amounts to a gradation of representation, resulting from elected 
officials’ constitutionally prescribed powers of appointment. The 
United States never was a “pure Democracy . . . consisting of a small 
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in 
person,” because such a government “can admit of no cure for the 
mischiefs of faction.”61 Rather, the republican U.S. system rejects the 
Greek model of democracy by providing for “the total exclusion of the 
people in their collective capacity from any share in the [American 
 57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1982). 
 58. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 18. 
 59. Barry Friedman, Diagolue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 579 (1993). 
Friedman argues that legal scholarship following Bickel concerning judicial review and the 
countermajoritarian difficulty “rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation.” Id. at 580. 
He suggests that in reality federal courts “do not trump majority will, or remain unaccountable 
to majority sentiment, nearly to the extent usually depicted. Measured by a realistic baseline of 
majoritarianism, courts are relatively majoritarian,” id. at 586, on the basis that (1) “courts 
frequently draw upon evidence of majoritarian will in reaching decisions,” and (2) an 
examination of “whether the selection and accountability of judges somehow differs so 
significantly from that of other governmental officials as to account for the countermajoritarian 
label affixed to courts,” shows that the American system indeed places “accountability 
constraints on the judiciary,” id. at 590. 
 60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Willis ed., 1982). 
 61. Id. NO. 10, at 46 (James Madison). 
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Governments].”62 In truth, the Constitution removes federal judges 
one more step from the people than it did even the pre–Seventeenth 
Amendment Senate—whose senators were elected by the state 
legislatures from among themselves, and not directly by the people—
that Madison describes in The Federalist No. 63. Nevertheless, 
presidential appointment of federal judges coupled with their 
ratification by the “Advice and Consent of the Senate”63 still effects 
Madison’s “policy” of “successive filtrations”64 meant to place the 
most qualified and virtuous people into such offices. Thus, the 
republican nature of American democracy and the policy of 
successive filtration recast the admitted countermajoritarianism of 
judicial review as an integral part of the U.S. constitutional system of 
representative democracy, rather than as deviant to it. 
But twentieth-century scholarship has largely stigmatized judicial 
review. Particularly since Bickel’s 1962 description of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, judicial review has carried with it a 
presumption of illegitimacy.65 Concerns about judicial review often 
stem from a natural side effect of the use of judicial review to strike 
down a statute passed by the legislature on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality: the impact of such a decision on political or 
social policy may constitute judicial legislation. Moreover, a judge or 
court may consciously pursue a course of judicial activism intended 
to create public policy favorable to a particular ideology. Indeed, 
political ideology plays a large role in how one perceives the exercise 
of judicial review. A liberal will decry the Rehnquist Court for 
judicial activism; a conservative will reply that the Rehnquist Court is 
merely reining legislative power back into its constitutional scope, 
accusing the Warren and Burger Courts of unacceptable 
implementation of judicial review amounting to judicial legislation. 
Either way, a perception of countermajoritarianism inheres in the 
 62. Id. NO. 63, at 322 (James Madison). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 64. 1 JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 81 (E.H. Scott ed., 
Chicago, Albert, Scott & Co. 1893) (1840). 
 65. See Friedman, supra note 59, at 578 (“At least since Alexander Bickel’s The Least 
Dangerous Branch, constitutional scholars have been preoccupied, indeed one might say 
obsessed, by the perceived necessity of legitimizing judicial review.”); Bruce A. Ackerman, The 
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1016 (1984) (quoted in 
Friedman, supra note 59, at 578 n.3) (“Hardly a year goes by without some learned professor 
announcing that he has discovered the final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, or, 
even more darkly, that the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble.”). 
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nature of the federal judiciary, implicating a “difficulty” in federal 
judges’ capacity for judicial legislation. 
Concerns about the countermajoritarian difficulty apply not only 
to the judicial review exercised by the Supreme Court in 
constitutional decisions, but also more broadly to decisions of the 
lower federal courts, and even to the role of courts in general. Lower 
federal judges face the countermajoritarian difficulty for the same 
reasons as the Supreme Court: they are unelected, and so when they 
engage in judicial legislation through the creation of public policy 
that either naturally or intentionally accompanies their decisions, 
their actions seem undemocratic. The role of federal judges in ATCA 
litigation provides a strident example of this effect. The Constitution 
reserves to the executive branch the prerogative of conducting 
foreign policy.66 But through their decisions on cases brought under 
the ATCA, federal judges intrude into the executive’s sphere, 
facilitating “plaintiff’s diplomacy” by allowing alien victims to sue 
despots for certain violations of customary international law 
committed in a foreign country.67 Compounding this applied 
countermajoritarianism, ATCA litigation allows federal judges to 
preempt the policymaking role of foreign legislatures by participating 
in the creation of political or social policy in those countries.68 Part 
III explores both “plaintiff’s diplomacy” and judicial legislation 
resulting from federal judges’ (countermajoritarian) decisions under 
the ATCA. 
Other courts engage in judicial legislation through their 
decisions as well; indeed, a court can hardly avoid doing so if the 
natural consequences of its decisions have the effect of creating 
policy. Some courts engage in judicial legislation more consciously 
than others. For example, the Supreme Court of India maintains a 
decidedly activist reputation.69 Similarly, the European Court of 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S 
AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 152 (2002) (providing a “taxonomy” for “the general 
principle that the Constitution vests the president with the authority to formulate and 
implement the foreign policy of the United States”). 
 67. See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the Falun Gong cases which exhibit 
“plaintiff’s diplomacy” in action as a tool for attempting to achieve human rights reform in 
China through accountability. 
 68. See infra Part III.B.3.b for an examination of federal courts’ capacity to preempt 
legislative policymaking in foreign countries through ATCA litigation. 
 69. See Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the 
World’s Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW & PUBLIC POLICY 77 
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Justice has pursued an agenda of judicial activism with regard to 
Community Law.70 Generally speaking, judicial activism is on the rise 
in a global “judicialization of politics,”71 in which judicial activism 
means “the transfer of decision-making rights from the legislature, 
the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts.”72 Not surprisingly, 
judicial legislation—the judicial creation of public policy, whether 
through explicit judicial activism or not—will also surface in the 
decisions of the ICC. Considering U.S. preoccupation with 
“legitimizing” the domestic countermajoritarian difficulty, the ICC’s 
own structural “democratic deficit” coupled with its potential for 
judicial legislation, arguably a countermajoritarian difficulty on an 
international scale, is a constitutional concern for the United States.73 
Part IV addresses the countermajoritarian difficulty in terms of the 
ICC. Interestingly, the ICC’s potential for judicial legislation on 
certain policy issues seems to worry the United States more than the 
possibility that U.S. federal judges might create public policy in 
foreign countries through ATCA litigation. 
(Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public 
Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989). 
 70. Christoph Henkel, Constitutionalism of the European Union: Judicial Legislation 
and Political Decision-Making by the European Court of Justice, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 153, 154 
(2001) (noting that “the expansion of judicial review by the European Court of Justice 
remains the driving force behind the development of constitutionalism of the European 
Union,” and positing that “the case law of the Court of Justice in part reflects the judicial 
activism comparable to early U.S. Supreme Court assertions of federal power”); Mark C. 
Miller, A Comparison of Two Evolving Courts: The Canadian Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Justice, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 27, 58 (1999) (concluding that “[t]he 
European Court of Justice has been much less hesitant to use judicial activism” than the 
Canadian Supreme Court in its “quasi-federal polity”); Jürgen Schwarze, Judicial Review in 
EC Law—Some Reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 17 (2002) (identifying problems with judicial review exercised by the European Court of 
Justice and focusing on the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the 
German Bundesgerichtshof). But see David J. Gerber, The Transformation of European 
Community Competition Law?, 35 HARV. INT’L L. J. 97, 130 (1994) (observing that the 
European Court of Justice is becoming less activist). 
 71. C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The 
Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 2 (C. Neal Tate & 
Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995) (designating the United States as the “home of the 
judicialization of politics”). 
 72. Torbjörn Vallinder, When the Courts Go Marching In, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION 
OF JUDICIAL POWER 13 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995). 
 73. See infra Parts IV.B.1–2 for a treatment of structural and prudential arguments 
arising from the ICC’s “democratic deficit.” 
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III. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY IN ATCA 
LITIGATION 
ATCA litigation incorporates the countermajoritarian difficulty 
as nonelected federal judges both participate in foreign policy—
constituting an encroachment by the nonelected judiciary on the 
responsibilities of the elected President—and create public policy in 
foreign countries, a job that elected legislatures in those countries are 
best suited to perform. Of course, despite criticisms of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty in the U.S. judiciary, it has “long been 
an integral part of our system of government,” and is “both firmly 
entrenched and fully accepted.”74 So an expression of it arising out of 
civil litigation under the ATCA conducted in U.S. federal courts 
might not be very distressing, even if it were on an international 
scale. But the United States strongly opposes the ICC partly on the 
basis that it may engage in judicial legislation, preempting 
Congress’s policymaking role in the United States. Remarkably, 
though, U.S. ATCA litigation relies on a legal framework that closely 
resembles the rejected premises underlying the ICC: universal 
jurisdiction and a substantially similar list of crimes to which 
universal jurisdiction attaches in both the ATCA and the ICC. This 
Part gives a broad overview of ATCA litigation, surveying the U.S. 
expansion of universal jurisdiction—which the United States denies 
exists in the context of the ICC—to cover violations of evolving 
customary international law under its auspices. 
A. Universal Jurisdiction and Customary International Law in the 
ATCA 
At first, the concept that an alien can sue another alien in U.S. 
federal court for an offense committed in a foreign country seems, 
frankly, alien. In fact, the ATCA permits only aliens to sue, and not 
U.S. citizens,75 a situation that Congress remedied in attaching the 
TVPA to the ATCA in 1991.76 But the principle of universal 
jurisdiction clarifies how the United States could possibly claim 
 74. Friedman, supra note 59, at 578. 
 75. Stephens, supra note 24, at 125. 
 76. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 
(“While the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a 
civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad.”). 
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jurisdiction77 in a case between two aliens for a crime committed 
abroad. 
Universal jurisdiction is an instrument of international justice 
that reaches violators of certain customary international laws or jus 
cogens norms78 regardless of where they may be. “Under the principle 
of universal jurisdiction a state is entitled or even required to bring 
proceedings in respect of certain serious crimes, irrespective of the 
location of the crime, and irrespective of the nationality of the 
perpetrator or the victim.”79 The concept of universal jurisdiction 
implies some consensus on what crimes should trigger it: “[b]y 
qualifying certain crimes as being subject to universal jurisdiction the 
international community signals that they are so appalling that they 
represent a threat to the international legal order.”80 Under the 
precursor to international law, the “law of nations” provided a 
“system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by 
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world,” and 
which “must necessarily result from those principles of natural 
justice, in which all the learned of every nation agree.”81 An early 
example of an offender subject to this type of jurisdiction was the 
pirate, who was seen as hostis humani generis, or an enemy of all 
mankind, by virtue of having “renounced all the benefits of society 
 77. Once it is clear that universal jurisdiction attaches to a certain offense, then serving 
process on a potential defendant while physically present in the territory of the United States, 
no matter how temporarily, provides the requisite personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
defendant. This is called “transient jurisdiction” or “tag jurisdiction.” Thomas E. 
Vanderbloemen, Note, Assessing the Potential Impact of the Proposed Hague Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Convention on Human Rights Litigation in the United States, 50 DUKE L.J. 917, 
928 (2000). 
 78. “Peremptory norms.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 
102 cmt. k (1987). The RESTATEMENT defines “peremptory norms” as 
rules of international law [which] are recognized by the international community of 
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and 
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict 
with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent 
norm of international law having the same character. It is generally accepted that the 
principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force . . . have the 
character of jus cogens. 
Id. 
 79. Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in 
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 940, 941–42 (2001). 
 80. Id. at 943. 
 81. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66–67. 
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and government, and ha[ving] reduced himself afresh to the savage 
state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind.”82
This concept has lived on and been elaborated upon in the 
notion of predicating universal jurisdiction on certain egregious 
violations of modern customary international law. International law 
is constantly evolving as practices “ripen” into legal norms over 
time;83 however, Blackstone’s notion of the necessity that a nation 
first consent before it can be bound by international law has survived 
as well in the notion of opinio juris, which means the point at which 
a country feels obligated to integrate a custom as law.84 The United 
States recognizes the concept of customary international law as an 
evolving body of law: in order to ascertain what the “law of 
nations”—or in modern parlance, international law—is, U.S. courts 
look to “the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by 
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions 
recognising and enforcing that law.”85 And over one hundred years 
ago, the Supreme Court declared that “[i]nternational law is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of 
 82. Id. at *71. 
 83. Poullaos, supra note 38, at 332. 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. c (1987). 
The RESTATEMENT describes how opinio juris functions: 
For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it must 
appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio 
juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states feel 
legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law. A practice initially 
followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states 
generally come to believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. It 
is often difficult to determine when that transformation into law has taken place. 
Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not 
necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or omissions. 
Id. 
 85. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820) (referring to the 
definition of piracy as found in the law of nations, “which is part of the common law,” in 
upholding the death sentence for a convicted pirate). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
found established international custom authoritative as a valid description of international law: 
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, 
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for 
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
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justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”86 
Therefore, once a custom has evolved into customary international 
law as evidenced by treaties, scholarly works, and judicial decisions, 
etc., then it is also U.S. law, provided there is opinio juris. 
Universal jurisdiction then attaches to certain violations of this 
evolved customary international law. Viewed conservatively, “[i]n 
customary international law, these crimes are piracy, the slave trade, 
and traffic in children and women. . . . The application of universal 
jurisdiction is also widely recognized for genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, that is, for the core crimes of the Rome 
Statute.”87 The law can develop further still into jus cogens norms—or 
peremptory norms of international law that are “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.”88 In this sense, jus cogens norms 
constitute the highest level of international law.89 Conceivably then, 
universal jurisdiction entailed in violations of jus cogens maintains a 
greater degree of certain validity than even universal jurisdiction 
inherent in certain grave breaches of customary international law,90 
which requires the consent of states to be binding. 
 86. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
 87. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 60 (2001). Furthermore, “[m]ore recently, some multilateral treaties have also 
recognized universal jurisdiction for particular offenses such as hijacking and other threats to 
air travel, piracy, attacks upon diplomats, nuclear safety, terrorism, apartheid, and torture.” Id. 
 88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
332. 
 89. Marc Rosen, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act: A Policy Solution, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461, 486 n.169 (1998) (“[T]here is 
no consensus among commentators as to how a norm precisely attains jus cogens status or 
what the consequences are if one does.”). 
 90. But see Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In 
Princz, a Holocaust survivor sued the Federal Republic of Germany directly for damages 
attendant to injuries inflicted on him at, and to slave labor performed in, a concentration 
camp. The survivor argued that “[a] foreign state that violates these fundamental requirements 
of a civilized world [i.e., jus cogens norms] thereby waives its right to be treated as a 
sovereign,” id. at 1173, meaning that Nazi Germany’s violation of jus cogens norms in 
perpetrating the Holocaust constituted an implied waiver of its sovereign immunity as a state, 
id. at 1176. But writing for the court, Judge Ruth Ginsburg rejected this argument, holding 
that despite Nazi Germany’s atrocious violations of jus cogens norms, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act required that a foreign government signal its submission to the jurisdiction of 
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B. The Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction  
Through “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy” 
The reach of the ATCA has extended significantly since its 
inclusion in the Judiciary Act of 1789 as the Alien Tort Statute.91 
What originally seems to have filled a conspicuous gap in U.S. law92 
by allowing foreign nationals to recover damages while in the United 
States, facilitating a respectable U.S. entrance into the community of 
nations,93 now “empower[s] the United States judiciary to bring to 
justice autocratic leaders who have little or no concern for human 
rights.”94 Essentially, alien plaintiffs can now use the ATCA to 
achieve human rights reforms in other countries by forcing 
accountability for human rights abuses through U.S. courts, even—
and usually—absent the alien defendants’ consent to U.S. 
jurisdiction. “Plaintiff’s diplomacy” currently thrives in federal 
courts. 
1. A case study of “plaintiff’s diplomacy” in action: the Falun Gong 
experience 
On October 23, 2002, during a brief visit to Chicago, Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin was served process for a class-action lawsuit 
charging him “with orchestrating a campaign of torture and murder 
against countless Falungong [sic] practitioners in China.”95 Since 
the country in which the suit is filed, which the government of Nazi Germany had not done. 
Id. at 1174. But cf. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 107–08 (discussing successful 
Holocaust recovery cases in the late 1990s in which the plaintiffs successfully sued corporations 
that contributed to or benefited from the atrocities, rather than the state directly). 
 91. The original language of the Alien Tort Statute read: “That the district courts shall 
have . . . cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as 
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789). 
Compare supra note 23 for the modern reading of the ATCA, in which “original jurisdiction” 
replaces “cognizance” and “any civil action” replaces “all causes.” 
 92. See generally Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 114 (1784) 
(having to resort to the criminal common law of Pennsylvania, which incorporated the “law of 
nations,” in order to grant French plaintiff, an injured French diplomat to the United States, 
relief from defendant, a French citizen, for an assault that occurred in the United States). 
 93. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (observing that the United 
States must be in a position to fulfill its legal obligations vis-à-vis other nations). 
 94. Poullaos, supra note 38, at 356. 
 95. Falungong Sues Jiang for Damages for Rights Abuses in U.S. Court, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 24, 2002, 2002 WL 23632580 [hereinafter Falungong Sues Jiang]. 
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1999, the Chinese government has cracked down brutally96 on 
adherents of the Falun Gong,97 which the Chinese government 
characterizes as an “evil cult and a threat to society.”98 In response to 
the systematic abuse of their human rights, Falun Gong practitioners 
have turned to, among other things, the ATCA both for a remedy 
and in an attempt at prevention. Actually, attorneys for the Falun 
Gong have indicated that these lawsuits aim more at prevention than 
at monetary satisfaction: “this lawsuit is not about money, it’s about 
stopping the persecution.”99 The Center for Justice and 
Accountability100 is handling another pending case for the Falun 
Gong, Doe v. Liu Qi101 (as well as cases for other victims), with 
 96. See Kelly A. Thomas, Falun Gong: An Analysis of China’s National Security 
Concerns, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 471, 472 (2001) (“The government-sponsored attack on 
Falun Gong has been marked by arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, custodial deaths, 
show trials resulting in lengthy prison sentences, and government-imposed psychiatric 
commitments.”). 
 97. Erin Chlopak describes Falun Gong or Falun Dafa as 
an ancient Chinese meditation practice, or gigong, which seeks to nurture the mind 
and body through the mixture of Buddhist beliefs, slow movements, and martial-art-
type exercises, while emphasizing the fundamental principles of “truth, benevolence, 
and forbearance.” Literally, “Falun Gong” means “Cultivation of the Wheel of 
Law,” while “Falun Dafa” translates to “Great Wheel of Buddha’s Law.” 
Erin Chlopak, China’s Crackdown on Falun Gong, 9 NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 17, 17 (2001); 
see also Falun Dafa website at http://www.clearwisdom.net (last visited May 1, 2003). 
 98. John Pomfret & Philip P. Pan, Torture Is Breaking Falun Gong; China Systematically 
Eradicating Group, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at A01 (“But the underlying reason for the 
crackdown is the [Chinese] leadership’s view that Falun Gong is an independent organization 
that threatens the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.”); see also Chen Huanzhong, A 
Brief Overview of Law and Religion in the People’s Republic of China, 2003 BYU L. REV. 465, 
473 (“Few governments would likely tolerate a confrontational force like the one presented by 
the Falun Gong, regardless of its depiction as a religion.”). 
 99. Falungong Sues Jiang, supra note 95 (quoting Terri A. Marsh, attorney for the 
Falun Gong). 
 100. See Center for Justice and Accountability (“CJA”) website, 
http://www.cja.org/cases/ cases.shtml (last visited March 15, 2003) [hereinafter CJA 
website] (“CJA brings civil lawsuits in U.S. courts against human rights violators who live, visit 
or keep assets in the U.S. . . . The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) forms the principal [sic] legal 
basis of suits brought by the CJA.”). 
 101. Civil No. C 02-0672 CW (EMC) (N.D. Cal.) (case pending) (alleging that Liu, the 
Mayor of Beijing, knew or should have known about the human rights abuses perpetrated 
against Falun Gong practitioners in Beijing and that he violated a duty under both Chinese 
and international law by not preventing the abuses); Plaintiff A. v. Xia Deren, Civil No. 02-
0695 CW (EMC) (N.D. Cal.) (case pending) (bringing a complaint against a defendant acting 
in his official capacity as a member of the Chinese government). See the CJA website for 
regularly published updates on the progress of these two pending Falun Gong cases that have 
been consolidated. 
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precisely this goal, as are numerous other public interest groups 
interested in effecting changes in foreign governments whose policies 
violate human rights. In other words, private plaintiffs are entering 
the diplomatic ring through the U.S. courts. 
For the Falun Gong, this approach has already obtained results—
though perhaps not exactly what the Falun Gong had in mind. In 
Peng Liang v. Zhao Zhifei,102 Peng Liang, a Chinese plaintiff, 
entrusted Falun Gong contacts in America to bring a $50 million 
wrongful death lawsuit under the ATCA and the TVPA on his behalf 
against Zhao Zhifei, Head of Public Security for the Hubei Province 
in China.103 Police in Hubei under Zhao’s command had tortured 
Peng’s mother and brother to death. Zhao was served process while 
on a visit to New York City.104 Rather than appearing in New York 
City for trial, Zhao allegedly returned to China and promptly 
arrested Peng on August 30, 2001, after which Peng disappeared 
until January 2002.105 Additionally, Zhao’s security police “arrested 
and cruelly tortured”106 Falun Gong practitioners who were thought 
to be associated with Peng. Because Zhao did not appear in court to 
defend himself against the charges, the court entered a default 
judgment against him. Attorneys for the Falun Gong hailed the 
outcome as a victory because “[t]oday, the Chinese Government’s 
persecution of Falun Dafa in violation of international law has been 
acknowledged in the United States District Court. The defendant 
cannot deny this judgment.”107 Due to the extreme difficulties in 
 102. No. 01 Civil 6535 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. default judgment entered Dec. 21, 2001), 
reported in Falun Dafa Information Center, Judgment Against High-Ranking Chinese Official 
Handed Down by U.S. Court, FRIENDS OF FALUN GONG, USA, Dec. 23, 2001, at 
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_story.php?doc_id=233 (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter Judgment Against High-Ranking Chinese Official]. 
 103. See Falun Dafa Information Center, Plaintiff in Lawsuit Against High-Ranking 
Chinese Official Arrested; Denied All Contact with Outside World, FRIENDS OF FALUN GONG, 
USA, Jan. 13, 2002, at http://www.fofg.org/news/plaintiff_arrested.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2003) [hereinafter Plaintiff in Lawsuit]. 
 104. Sect Sues Chinese Official in New York, N.Y. POST, July 19, 2001, at 21, available at 
2001 WL 23409485. 
 105. Plaintiff in Lawsuit, supra note 103. 
 106. Falun Dafa Information Center, US Lawsuit Against Official Zhao Zhifei Results in 
Massive Arrests and Torture of Falun Gong Practitioners in China’s Hubei Province, FALUN 
DAFA CLEARWISDOM.NET, Oct. 13, 2001, at http://clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/ 
2001/10/16/14733p.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). 
 107. Judgment Against High-Ranking Chinese Official, supra note 102 (quoting 
plaintiff’s co-counsel, Terri A. Marsh). 
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trying to collect on massive damage awards in these ATCA suits,108 
such victories are largely symbolic; but those who bring these suits 
also hope for a deterrent effect,109 since U.S. courts can attach 
defendants’ U.S. assets in satisfaction. 
2. The evolution of ATCA litigation as the tool of “plaintiff’s 
diplomacy” 
Under current application of the ATCA, human rights groups 
can seek out past victims110 who will make likely plaintiffs in cases 
that these groups hope will impact the policies of regimes that abuse 
human rights. Since 1980, the list of such cases has grown longer 
year by year. How did the ATCA transform into a judicial 
instrument of such positive action in approaching human rights 
abuses? The answer surfaces in the dynamic nature of customary 
international law, which has replaced the appellation “law of 
nations,” a violation of which triggers liability under the ATCA. U.S. 
courts have not shied away from (re)interpreting the “law of 
nations” for use in U.S. courts,111 and the very nature of the sources 
listed in United States v. Smith and endorsed in The Paquete Habana 
from which to deduce the current state of customary international 
law implies that it is dynamic, or in other words, evolving. 
The Second Circuit looked precisely to such sources—and 
expressly to the precedent of The Paquete Habana—in a thorough 
survey of customary international law as it has evolved over time in 
order to find against the defendant in the seminal ATCA case of 
 108. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350 
Judgments Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177 (1998) (discussing situations in which collection of 
these judgments might be easier and suggesting how to approach ATCA and TVPA suits so 
that foreign judiciaries and states will recognize them). 
 109. But see Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to 
Honorable Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States 
Department of Justice, “Re: Doe, et al. v. Liu Qi, et al., and Plaintiff A, et al. v. Xia Deren, 
Civil Nos. C 02–0672 CW (EMC) and C 02–0695 CW (EMC) (N.D. Cal.)” (Sept. 25, 
2002), http://www.cja.org/ChinaStateDept.pdf (last visited May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Taft 
Letter] (“In our judgment, adjudication of these multiple [Falun Gong] lawsuits [under the 
ATCA and the TVPA], including the cases before Magistrate Chen, is not the best way for the 
United States to advance the cause of human rights in China.”). 
 110. See CJA website, supra note 100 (“CJA works with survivor communities, human 
rights organizations, and torture treatment centers throughout the United States to help 
torture survivors seek legal remedies for their injuries.”). 
 111. See supra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 84–86. 
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Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.112 Through this case, the court resurrected 
ATCA litigation and put it in the position to act as a tool against 
human rights abuses. In Filartiga, the Paraguayan father and sister 
of a man tortured and killed in Paraguay brought suit against the 
perpetrator—the former Paraguayan Inspector General of Police—in 
U.S. court. The court found that because the defendant was acting 
under color of state law at the time, he was capable of violating 
international law.113 In order to ascertain exactly what the “law of 
nations” or international law was that the defendant had allegedly 
violated, the court looked to the exact types of sources listed in 
United States v. Smith and in the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, Articles 38 and 59, to find what constituted ripened 
customary international law.114 For the court in Filartiga, these 
sources included United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,115 as one of the “basic 
principles of international law,”116 other international conventions, 
covenants, and treaties,117 the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution,118 and even to articles from the Harvard International 
Law Journal and the International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly.119 On the basis of these authorities, which The Paquete 
Habana certified as “trustworthy evidence of what the [customary 
international] law really is,”120 the court in Filartiga found that the 
Paraguayan defendant could be liable in a U.S. court for his crimes 
of torture and murder committed against Paraguayan citizens in 
Paraguay because “the torturer has become like the pirate and slave 
trader before him––hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.”121 In other words, universal jurisdiction has now attached 
to the torturer when acting under color of state law, just as it had 
attached to the pirate of the eighteenth century, whom Blackstone 
 112. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 113. Id. at 884–85. 
 114. Id. at 880–81 & n.8; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 
102 (1987). 
 115. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882–84. 
 116. Id. at 882. 
 117. Id. at 884. 
 118. Id. at 884 n.13. 
 119. Id. at 883. 
 120. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 121. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. 
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would see hunted by every country. The Filartiga court clearly 
affirmed the notion that customary international law is constantly 
evolving122 and that official torture now stands on the list of crimes to 
which universal jurisdiction attaches in that canon of law. 
Significantly, the dynamic nature of customary international law 
has come to allow U.S. courts to use it as a basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction in ATCA litigation since Filartiga over substantially the 
same three crimes that the ICC has jurisdiction to try criminally—
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—through the 
universal jurisdiction that U.S. courts have recognized as inherent in 
these crimes. This expansion of the reach of universal jurisdiction has 
been gradual but well-founded and judiciously implemented. True, 
in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,123 Judge Bork denied that 
customary international law had developed to include these crimes 
and insisted that the ATCA only be interpreted under the law of 
nations as it stood in 1789. Under this view, the only three crimes 
that could violate the law of nations and thus serve as a basis for an 
ATCA suit would be violations of safe conduct, infringements on the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.124 But Judge Bork did not have the 
last word on ATCA litigation. 
Seven years after Tel-Oren, Congress responded directly to Judge 
Bork’s criticism of the Filartiga court’s application of the ATCA. In 
addition to contending that in applying the ATCA the court should 
interpret the law of nations as in 1789, Judge Bork had also opined 
in Tel-Oren that the ATCA identifies “a class of cases federal courts 
can hear,” but does not “authorize individuals to bring such 
cases.”125 In response, Congress enacted the TVPA126 to provide “a 
private right of action” and “a clear and specific remedy, not limited 
to aliens, for torture or extrajudicial killing.”127 Specifically, the 
TVPA “authorizes the Federal courts to hear cases brought by or on 
behalf of a victim of any individual who, under actual or apparent 
 122. Id. at 881 (“[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”). 
 123. 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. (Bork, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 811 (Bork, J., concurring). But see Dodge, supra note 39, at 224 (“Filartiga 
is more consistent with the original understanding of the Alien Tort Clause than the 
interpretations advanced by Judge Bork . . . .”).  
 126. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)). 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86. 
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authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation, subjects a person to 
torture or extrajudicial killing.”128 Acquiescing to international law, 
Congress explicitly stated that “[the TVPA] defines ‘torture’ and 
‘extrajudicial killing’ in accordance with international standards,” 
especially the Torture Convention.129 In fact, in implementing 
legislation for the Torture Convention in 1994, Congress further 
ratified the substance of international law on this point by creating a 
U.S. criminal statute allowing the Department of Justice to 
prosecute foreign defendants accused of torture, wherever 
committed.130 Essentially, contrary to Judge Bork’s position in Tel-
Oren, Congress encoded through the TVPA Filartiga’s notion that 
international law should be interpreted as evolved rather than as it 
stood in 1789. 
More than a decade after Tel-Oren, ATCA litigation emerged 
stronger than ever in the courts. In fact, the Second Circuit 
expanded its applicability precisely on the basis of dynamic—
“ripened”—customary international law, as acknowledged by 
Congress in passing the TVPA. In Kadic v. Karadži ,131 a suit 
against the self-proclaimed President of the breakaway Republic of 
Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Second Circuit expanded 
ATCA litigation’s universal jurisdiction in two ways. First, whereas 
the Second Circuit in Filartiga had found narrowly that the ATCA 
applied to violators of international law, which could only be state 
actors, the court in Kadic held that “certain forms of conduct violate 
the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the 
 128. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87. 
 129. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc A/39/51 
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987). In language substantially similar to the Torture 
Convention, the TVPA defines torture as 
any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, 
by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or 
inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that 
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual 
for an act that [an] individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for 
any reason based on discrimination of any kind[.] 
Pub. L. 102-256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
 130. Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, § 
506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340B (1994)). 
 131. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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auspices of a state or only as private individuals.”132 Then, through 
reference to customary international law as further evolved from the 
time of Filartiga fifteen years before, the Kadic court certified that 
genocide and war crimes now constitute such violations.133 Based on 
its status in the international treaties that determine the state of 
customary international law, torture retained the requirement that it 
be conducted under color of state law, unless committed in the 
course of a genocidal campaign.134 Thus, in ATCA litigation, U.S. 
courts can now try foreign individuals for crimes committed 
abroad—against foreign plaintiffs—that are substantially similar to 
the crimes in the ICC Statute on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
inherent in these violations of customary international law. 
Furthermore, U.S. courts have accepted and incorporated definitions 
of these crimes as found in customary international law in ATCA 
litigation in order to obtain the universal jurisdiction that attaches. 
A more recent case hailing from the same turbulent region, this 
time a result of Serbian atrocities in their campaign of “ethnic 
cleansing,” reinforces the U.S. incorporation of the substance of 
customary international law. In Mehinovic v. Vuckovic,135 four 
Bosnian Muslim plaintiffs sued their former torturer, a Bosnian Serb, 
in federal court after they discovered that the defendant had settled 
in Atlanta, Georgia. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the 
defendant, previously their neighbor in the Bosnian town of 
Bosanski Samac, had perpetrated a long list of human rights abuses 
on them and others.136 In a straightforward decision, the court 
found, based on the revolting and incredibly humiliating torture that 
the defendant inflicted upon the plaintiffs, that the defendant 
“committed the following violations of customary international law, 
which confer jurisdiction, and establish liability, under the ATCA: 
torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary detention; 
 132. Id. at 239 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 240. 
 134. Id. at 244. 
 135. 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
 136. The complaint reads: “First Amended Complaint for Civil Conspiracy; Genocide; 
War Crimes; Crimes Against Humanity; Torture; Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment; 
Arbitrary Detention Without Trial; Assault and Battery; False Arrest and False Imprisonment; 
and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” Complaint, Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (No. 1 98–CV.2470), http://www.cja.org/cases/ 
Mehinovic_Complaint.html. 
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war crimes; and crimes against humanity.”137 In so holding, the court 
followed Kadic and referred to both ATCA/TVPA case law and 
numerous international instruments for the definitions of these 
crimes.138
Interestingly, the ICC’s definitions of crimes also closely 
resemble the definitions of these crimes in customary international 
law, and, in some cases, are even more restrictive.139 Such definitional 
resemblance is ironic in light of the U.S. objections to the ICC 
founded on universal jurisdiction and the definitions of the crimes in 
the ICC Statute. It also suggests that universal jurisdiction and the 
definitions of crimes in the ICC Statute do not necessarily constitute 
insurmountable barriers to U.S. participation140—for the sake of 
consistency with U.S. use of these factors to justify ATCA litigation 
it may even invite participation. Rather, these factors combine with 
aspects of the ICC’s structure and its potential for judicial legislation 
to form a countermajoritarian difficulty on an international scale that 
may threaten the role of American policymakers on these issues, 
which is likely the more fundamental objection to U.S. participation 
in the ICC. ATCA litigation’s “plaintiff’s diplomacy” provides an 
example of how such internationalized judicial legislation can 
interfere with domestic policymaking. 
3. The policymaking potential of “plaintiff’s diplomacy”: domestic and 
international intrusion 
a. Infringing on the U.S. executive. The very fact that private 
plaintiffs—or the pressure groups behind them—can enter the 
foreign policy arena using U.S. courts as their vehicle, as in the Falun 
Gong cases, implicates a separation of powers conundrum. True, the 
executive and legislative branches compete for supremacy in foreign 
policy because the Constitution foresees a role for both in it. “In 
periods when the president is energetic, popular and politically 
adept, or when the nation is at war or threatened by foreign 
developments, the executive ordinarily is dominant.”141 But the 
overlap and competition in this arena exists between the executive 
 137. Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. 
 138. See id. at 1345–55 (examining the definitions of each of the crimes separately). 
 139. See infra text accompanying notes 188–192. 
 140. See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 141. POWELL, supra note 66, at 5. 
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and the legislative, not between the executive and the judicial 
branches. Indeed, “law, including the law of the Constitution, can 
provide little help in resolving most disputes over American foreign 
policy. . . . Foreign-policy arguments present issues that demand 
political consideration, with all the breadth of moral, social, 
economic and prudential concerns that political debate can 
encompass.”142 Either way, foreign policy belongs in the hands of 
elected officials, not unelected federal judges. 
The expansion of ATCA litigation and the goals of some of those 
who use it increasingly put judges into a position where their 
decisions infringe on foreign policy. Although “[n]ot every case 
touching foreign relations is nonjusticiable,”143 federal judges lack the 
direct political accountability to influence foreign policy. The State 
Department anticipated complications inherent in such an intrusive 
judiciary in Senate hearings preceding the enactment of the TVPA: 
From a foreign policy perspective, we are particularly concerned 
over the prospect of nuisance or harassment suits brought by 
political opponents or for publicity purposes. . . . Even when the 
foreign government declines to defend and a default judgment 
results, such suits have the potential of creating significant 
problems for the Executive’s management of foreign policy.144
The State Department reiterated these concerns in the context of the 
“plaintiff’s diplomacy” in the Falun Gong cases: 
The Executive Branch has many tools at its disposal to promote 
adherence to human rights in China, and it will continue to apply 
those tools within the context of our broader foreign policy 
interests. 
 . . . . 
 We ask the Court in particular to take into account the potential 
for reciprocal treatment of United States officials by foreign courts 
in efforts to challenge U.S. government policy. In addressing these 
cases, the Court should bear in mind a potential future suit by 
 142. Id. at 7. 
 143. Kadic v. Karadži, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 144. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28 
(1990) (prepared statement of David P. Stewart, Department of State). 
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individuals (including foreign nationals) in a foreign court against 
U.S. officials for alleged violations of customary international law in 
carrying out their official functions under the Constitution, laws 
and programs of the United States (e.g., with respect to capital 
punishment, or for complicity in human rights abuses by 
conducting foreign relations with regimes accused of those abuses). 
The Court should bear in mind the potential that the United States 
government will intervene on behalf of its interests in such cases.145
In reflecting upon the negative effect that “plaintiff’s diplomacy” can 
have on foreign relations, these State Department concerns also echo 
U.S. objections to the ICC. 
b. Infringing on foreign governments’ policies. When ATCA 
litigation intrudes on the U.S. Executive Branch’s foreign policy 
prerogatives, it also necessarily engages in judicial legislation in 
foreign countries. Particularly, ATCA suits against corporations 
exemplify this countermajoritarianism. “By targeting major 
corporations and business concerns, private plaintiffs have thus 
become a diplomatic force in their own right, forcing governments 
to pay attention at the highest levels.”146 These types of suits can 
more successfully force reform in other countries than the Falun 
Gong suits, or others like them, which make foreign government 
officials—who enjoy statutory sovereign immunity while still in 
office—the defendants: 
[I]n most of these cases, the governments involved are of 
developing countries heavily dependent on foreign investment. 
They therefore find themselves caught in a painful bind. Public 
pressure and the possibility of a large payout may pull a state 
toward supporting a lawsuit, but the danger of scaring off future 
investment will tug in the other direction.147
In this way, federal judges may engage in judicial legislation through 
ATCA/TVPA suits because some countries may prefer to change 
policies rather than face “de facto sanctions” in the form of massive 
 145. Taft Letter, supra note 109, at 7–8; cf. Tremble, Holland, Tremble, ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 1, 2001, at 27 (reporting that the U.S. “Hague Invasion Act,” or rather the pending 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2001, which would “authorise the president to 
send troops to release Americans or allies held by the international tribunal[,] . . . has not gone 
down well with allies”).  
 146. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 107 (noting successful cases against German 
corporations and Swiss banks that participated in or gained from the Holocaust). 
 147. Id. at 110. 
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damages awards in U.S. courts against corporations doing business 
in the United States and the subsequent freezing of assets from 
which to pay the amounts due. 
On the one hand, this judicial legislation—countermajoritarian 
on an international scale or not—has an undeniably positive effect if 
it stops ongoing atrocities in those countries. For example, in 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,148 the court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss a massive class action suit 
brought under the ATCA/TVPA. The Sudanese plaintiffs alleged 
that the defendant, a Canadian energy company, “collaborated with 
Sudan in ‘ethnically cleansing’ civilian populations surrounding oil 
concessions located in southern Sudan in order to facilitate oil 
exploration and extraction activities.”149 In order to clear non-
Muslim residents from southern Sudan for these activities, the 
government of Sudan, which is “controlled by a ‘Taliban-style 
Islamic fundamentalist movement,’”150 resorted to “extrajudicial 
killing, forced displacement, military attacks on civilian targets, 
confiscation and destruction of property, kidnappings, rape, and the 
enslavement of civilians.”151 A massive judgment causing Sudan to 
rethink these policies—though highly unlikely—would be very 
positive. On the other hand, “[r]ulings by U.S. courts cannot 
substitute for the hard work of reaching consensus within foreign 
states on respect for human rights and responsible development.”152 
Indeed, the product of such judicial legislation would be decidedly 
countermajoritarian. And the concept of reciprocity in such areas of 
law has not eluded the State Department, especially in light of the 
United States’ use of the death penalty153 and dealings with regimes 
that abuse human rights. The ICC’s capacity for this kind of judicial 
legislation with regard to the three crimes under its jurisdiction 
evokes U.S. fears that it will attempt to preempt public policy in the 
United States, where a firmly established structure of ordered liberty 
 148. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 149. Id. at 296. 
 150. Id. at 298. 
 151. Id. at 296. 
 152. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 25, at 111. 
 153. See generally, Patrick Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s 
Human Rights Under International Law?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 833 (2000) (arguing that 
excessive delays on death row constitute a human rights violation and that international law 
will force states to modify their procedures). 
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and the political process are far better institutionally suited to engage 
in this kind of policymaking. 
IV. “DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” AND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY IN THE ICC 
The countermajoritarian difficulty enters discussion of the ICC 
through a perceived “democratic deficit” inherent in the court’s 
institutional nature. A similar democratic deficit exists in numerous 
other international institutions.154 The existence of a democratic 
deficit in the nature of the ICC implies that any judicial legislation 
that results from its decisions will constitute a countermajoritarian 
difficulty on an international scale. Part IV examines the concerns of 
universal jurisdiction and the definitions of crimes in the ICC statute 
in relation to the ICC’s capacity for judicial legislation on policy 
issues relating to those crimes. 
A. Jurisdiction(s) and Judicial Legislation in the ICC 
The Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes at the time of the 
Rome Conference, Adam Scheffer, stated in Senate hearings that one 
of the “major flaws” of the ICC Statute was its “de facto universal 
jurisdiction.”155 Others decried vague language in the definitions of 
the three crimes over which the ICC has subject-matter 
jurisdiction.156 Neither of these constitutes an insurmountable 
constitutional obstacle to U.S. ratification of the ICC Statute, 
particularly since the United States has already fully endorsed them 
and applied them in ATCA litigation.157 Rather, the “democratic 
 154. See supra Part I.B and note 42 for a discussion of the “democratic deficit” in 
international organizations. 
 155. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). 
 156. See, e.g., id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms), 59–62 (prepared statement of 
Hon. John R. Bolton). 
 157. See, e.g., Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 400–04 (addressing these and other 
fundamental constitutional concerns—many of them procedural—in the ICC statute and 
concluding that “as long as the ICC’s practices meet minimum standards of fairness, they 
should not prevent U.S. participation in the international court”); cf. Scott W. Andreasen, 
Note, The International Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the 
United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 697, 701–02 (2000) (highlighting potential constitutional 
concerns with procedural matters in the ICC Statute but suggesting ways to accommodate 
them in the interest of facilitating U.S. participation in the ICC). 
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deficit”158 posed by the nature of the ICC as an international 
institution with substantive authority poses a more formidable 
constitutional objection in the form of an internationalized 
countermajoritarian difficulty. 
1. “De facto universal jurisdiction” against “complementarity with 
teeth” 
The ICC Statute indeed contains an element of true universal 
jurisdiction, but that is not what Ambassador Scheffer was referring 
to in identifying a major flaw of the ICC as its “de facto universal 
jurisdiction” constituting a constitutional obstacle to ratification. 
The ICC provides a “two-track system of jurisdiction.”159 Under the 
first track, Article 13(b) gives the ICC full universal jurisdiction—as 
opposed to Scheffer’s de facto universal jurisdiction—over a crime, 
but only if “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes 
[referred to in Article 5] appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations.”160 The concept of universal 
jurisdiction allows the Security Council to prosecute these crimes 
even absent the ICC. 
Under the second track, Article 13(a) and (c) cover situations 
referred to the ICC by states parties or by the prosecutor propio 
motu.161 These referrals are restricted by the “[p]reconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction” under Article 12,162 which provide for state 
 158. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. See supra Part I.B and text accompanying note 42 
for a discussion of how international organizations often contain a perceived democratic 
deficit. 
 159. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P. 
Scharf). 
 160. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 13(b); see also ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 
9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P. Scharf) (“This track would be enforced by Security 
Council imposed embargoes, the freezing of assets of leaders and their supporters, and/or by 
authorizing the use of force. It is this track that the United States favored, and would be likely 
to utilize in the event of a future Bosnia or Rwanda.”). 
 161. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 13(a), (c). 
 162. The full text of Article 12 reads as follows: 
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction 
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5. 
2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: 
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consent—or rather “a right to dissent”163—to the ICC’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over a case: “[b]efore the ICC can act, its jurisdiction 
must be accepted either by the territorial state where the alleged 
crimes occurred or by the accused’s home state.”164 Still, critics find 
that “[t]he statute purports to give this international court 
jurisdiction over American citizens even if the United States refused 
to sign or ratify the treaty.”165 That is, Scheffer’s “de facto universal 
jurisdiction” arises out of Article 12’s language because of the 
general nature of a crime’s effect: 
Since a crime is generally committed wherever an illegal act has a 
harmful effect, allegedly illegal action by a person in a non-ratifying 
nation that has an impact in a second, ratifying, nation will subject 
that person to prosecution—even though that person’s nation has 
not ratified the ICC Statute.166
Critics fear that members of the U.S. military stationed abroad might 
face prosecution under this de facto universal jurisdiction.167 But the 
  (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if 
the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of 
that vessel or aircraft; 
  (b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The 
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9. 
Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 12. 
 163. KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, 
COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION 24 (2000). 
 164. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 23. 
 165. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms). 
 166. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 269. 
 167. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., 
July/Aug. 2001, at 86, 92–93; ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Sen. 
Jesse Helms). This is a well founded contention and even highlights how Scheffer’s de facto 
jurisdiction may indeed constitute true universal jurisdiction:  
[I]n certain situations jurisdiction is transferred to the Court from a state that does 
not approve of the Court’s establishment nor wishes to give up sovereignty in 
relation to the prosecution of its own nationals or on its own territory. It may be 
inferred that the Court has, according to the Statute, a limited amount of inherent 
[universal] jurisdiction in the true sense. 
MISKOWIAK, supra note 163, at 25–26. Cf. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 
(prepared statement of Michael P. Scharf) (“[T]he ICC Statute specifies that the Court would 
have jurisdiction only over ‘serious’ war crimes that represent a ‘policy.’ Thus, random acts of 
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ICC Statute provides further restrictions on universal jurisdiction 
than requiring just the consent of the non-party state. This track is 
substantially weaker than the first track because, unlike the first track, 
it “would have no built-in process for enforcement, but rather would 
rely on the good-faith cooperation of the Parties to the Court’s 
statute.”168 The ICC might claim jurisdiction under the second track 
over a citizen of a non-party state169 but could not oblige the United 
States to comply with this claim by extraditing the accused to the 
ICC. Moreover, the principle of “complementarity with teeth”170—
the ICC’s admissibility requirements for jurisdiction—under Articles 
1 and 17 further restricts the ICC’s jurisdiction under this second 
track. Under these provisions, ICC jurisdiction over any crime is 
complementary to the domestic jurisdiction of the states parties.171 
By barring the ICC from prosecuting a case that is already being 
prosecuted in good faith by a state party, complementarity 
constitutes a significant restriction to the ICC’s personal jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, U.S. acceptance of the dynamic nature of 
international law in the ATCA has at least three implications for ICC 
opponents’ objections to perceived universal jurisdiction in the 
Statute. First, even if U.S. law did not absorb customary 
international law, under the universal jurisdiction inherent in certain 
serious violations of international law, which evolves over time, 
“states can already try U.S. personnel under those general provisions 
[of genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions], regardless of the new regime 
U.S. personnel, such as the downing of the Iran Airbus by the USS Vincennes, would not be 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.”). 
 168. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P. 
Scharf). 
 169. Miskowiak provides the following example to illuminate this proposition: 
An American serviceman has committed war crimes of a serious nature on a large 
scale in Iraq. If: 
  (a) the United States has failed to prosecute him for the crime; and 
  (b) neither the United States nor Iraq is a party to the Statute but Iraq decides 
to  
  accept the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question; then 
the Court would have jurisdiction over the case. 
MISKOWIAK, supra note 163, at 26. 
 170. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 35 (statement by Michael P. Scharf). 
 171. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at arts. 1, 17. 
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constructed via the ICC.”172 The early case of United States v. Smith 
exemplified this principle through the Court’s treatment of the 
capital offense of piracy as defined in the law of nations, referring in 
dictum to Blackstone’s hostis humani generis reasoning.173 Regarding 
whether the listed offenses entail universal jurisdiction like their 
forerunner of piracy, even if the rather bold statement is true that 
“there is absolutely no authority in international cases or text to 
expand universal jurisdiction over piracy to reach other customary 
international crimes,”174 U.S. case law under the ATCA provides 
ample authority that such expansion has indeed occurred and has 
already been the basis for U.S. judgments against foreign 
defendants.175 Second, because the ICC Statute will itself be 
substantial evidence of the status of customary international law on 
the three crimes over which it has jurisdiction, U.S. law will 
incorporate those definitions under The Paquete Habana; thus even 
as a state party, the United States could evade the ICC’s universal 
jurisdiction by prosecuting these violations in good faith under 
Article 17’s “complementarity with teeth” principle. Finally, the 
United States could also bring the codified definitions of its own 
laws into convergence with the evolved definitions in customary 
international law as evidenced by the ICC definitions—which are not 
radically different since they are largely based on treaties to which the 
United States is a party—in order to avoid entanglements with the 
ICC’s de facto universal jurisdiction.176 But, of course, this prospect 
anticipates the more fundamental overarching concern with the ICC: 
its capacity for judicial legislation. 
 172. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986–87; Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal 
Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 150, 152 (“But the United States itself 
asserts such jurisdiction over others’ citizens when it prosecutes terrorists or drug traffickers, 
such as Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, without the consent of the suspect’s 
government.”). 
 173. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820). 
 174. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 271 (emphasis added). 
 175. Moreover, even outside the substantial weight of ATCA litigation—which shows 
that the United States accepts the expansion of universal jurisdiction from piracy alone to 
certain crimes substantially resembling the core crimes of the ICC Statute when cases are 
brought in U.S. courts—the United States has accepted universal jurisdiction in relation to at 
least genocide. See MISKOWIAK, supra note 163, at 27; see also supra Part III.B.2. 
 176. David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 
CORNELL INT’L L.J., Nov. 2001–Feb. 2002, at 47, 98. 
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2. Void for vagueness? The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC 
Problems with the language in the definitions of the crimes may 
be the easiest flaws of the ICC to fix vis-à-vis U.S. constitutional 
concerns, but only if the United States remains in a position to 
participate in the development of the court and its jurisprudence. 
Even proponents of the Statute admit that “there are areas of the 
Rome Statute that are vague and poorly drafted.”177 In addition to 
vague and ambiguous points in the definitions of the three crimes 
within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction—genocide,178 crimes 
against humanity,179 and war crimes180—the ICC Statute also provides 
for future inclusion of a crime of “aggression.”181 The addition of the 
new crime can occur following a statutory delay of seven years after 
the ICC Statute comes into effect182 and pursuant to a two-thirds 
majority of states parties.183 The prospect of adding the crime of 
aggression to the enumerated list greatly worries critics184 and 
disappoints some moderate proponents.185 But because any definition 
of aggression “shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
 177. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 27. 
 178. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 6. 
 179. Id. at art. 7. 
 180. Id. at art. 8. 
 181. Id. at art. 5(1)(d), (2). Concerning the future crime of aggression, this article of the 
Rome Statute provides the following: 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is 
adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out 
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this 
crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Id. at art. 5(2). 
 182. Id. at art. 121(1) (“After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this 
Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text of any proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
promptly circulate it to all State Parties.”); see also id. at art. 123(1). 
 183. Id. at art. 121(2)–(3). 
 184. See, e.g., ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms). 
Helms stated: 
Well, I think I can anticipate what will constitute a crime of aggression in the eyes of 
this court. It will be a crime of aggression when the United States of America takes 
any military action to defend the national interest of the American people unless the 
United States first seeks and receives the permission of the United Nations. And I 
say baloney to that. 
Id. (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms). 
 185. See, e.g., Bardavid, supra note 34, at 27. 
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Charter of the United Nations,”186 the ICC “will give deference to 
the Security Council to determine whether an act of aggression has 
occurred,”187 which the United States would view favorably. As an 
outsider to the treaty, however, the United States cannot contribute 
to the creation of a satisfactory definition of aggression or prevent 
the court from adding such a definition. 
Some ambiguity exists in the language of the other three 
enumerated crimes, but not to the extent that it would render them 
void for vagueness under constitutional ex post facto concerns. 
Indeed, “the provisions on crimes against humanity and war crimes 
were scrubbed and negotiated with tireless effort by U.S. 
negotiators, including in Rome.”188 The result was a list of three 
crimes all with “demarcated definitions which are, in most cases, 
considered more limited than their definitions in general 
international law.”189 The definition of the crime of genocide 
“mirrors the text of the [Genocide] Convention [of 1948] 
verbatim.”190 The definition for crimes against humanity predicates 
the crime on committing the proscribed acts “as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.”191 Finally, war crimes can only be 
committed as “part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.”192 These definitions have largely been 
incorporated into U.S. case law under ATCA litigation. But the 
components of crimes against humanity include ambiguous terms 
such as “forced pregnancy” and “persecution.” 
Certain pressure groups and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have made obvious their intention to exploit ambiguities in 
the ICC Statute to achieve their own radical agendas. This could 
conceivably have adverse effects, e.g., for the free exercise of 
traditional religions.193 Although this abuse of an international 
 186. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 5(2). 
 187. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 26. 
 188. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 17 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). 
 189. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 24. 
 190. Id. at 25. 
 191. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7(1). 
 192. Id. at art. 8(1). 
 193. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 20, at 273, 279, 283–87 (relaying the overt intention 
of pressure groups “hostile to religion and traditional values,” to use the court to achieve ends 
amounting to social engineering). 
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institution meant “to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the 
most serious crimes of international concern”194 is aggravating, it 
does not mean that such groups will be successful in their efforts. To 
the contrary, during the negotiations leading up to the Rome 
Statute, NGO Family Voice, a conservative pressure group, 
successfully lobbied against the attempts of such groups to insert 
ambiguous and exploitable language under the head of crimes 
against humanity in the form of a component vaguely described as 
“deprivation of liberty.”195 NGO Family Voice, working with other 
conservative pressure groups and governments, changed this 
ambiguous language to the more exact definition that now stands: 
“severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law.”196 It stands to reason that continued effort 
will produce similar results, just as the U.S. delegation was able to 
achieve the great majority of its objectives in the negotiations,197 as 
testified by Article 17’s “complementarity with teeth” provision. 
This and the other concessions made by the conference body to U.S. 
wishes in the negotiations “were sufficient for the other major 
powers, specifically the United Kingdom, France, and Russia.”198 
And the NGOs hostile to traditional values enjoy the same freedom 
to promote changes favorable to their views as do the NGOs 
defending religion and traditional values. 
In fact, in an ironic application of the same logic employed to 
suggest the ICC may enable the persecution of traditional religions, 
the ICC could actually put itself into the position of defending the 
free exercise of religion against abuses by both obvious and 
seemingly unlikely perpetrators. Of course, under this slippery slope 
logic, groups like the Falun Gong199 could resort to a centralized, 
 194. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
 195. Richard G. Wilkins et al., The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 5 (1999) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing NGO Family Voice’s activities while 
at the Rome Conference negotiations and their various successes in contributing to the ICC 
Statute). 
 196. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7(1)(e). 
 197. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 12 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer) 
(listing the numerous specific objectives that the body of the conference conceded to the U.S. 
delegation). 
 198. Id. at 36 (statement by Michael P. Scharf). 
 199. For treatment of the Falun Gong’s attempt to use the ATCA to achieve policy 
change in China’s human rights record, see supra Part III.B.1 and supra text accompanying 
notes 95–110. 
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international body in the ICC and seek criminal prosecution for the 
abuses they have suffered. Perhaps this recourse would free the Falun 
Gong from the danger of retribution for filing civil suits in the 
United States, to whose law China does not consent; or it might 
eventually prevent the abuses in the first place, especially if 
subordinates “cannot raise ‘following orders’ as a defense to their 
prosecution under the ICC statute . . . ; the fact that he was 
commanded by a superior is irrelevant.”200 In the case of seemingly 
unlikely persecutors, developments hostile to the free exercise of 
religion have been surfacing lately in Western democracies such as 
France,201 Germany,202 Belgium,203 and Russia.204 With their 
commitment to the rule of law and their dependence on 
international law,205 the prospect of prosecution in the ICC might 
actually promote a higher level of religious toleration in these 
countries. Of course, this, like the argument that the ICC will be 
used against leaders of traditional religions, is off base since the ICC 
only has jurisdiction over the three crimes enumerated in the statute. 
It merely illustrates that the same slippery slope logic can be applied 
both ways in relation to the ICC’s jurisdiction and definitions of 
 200. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 281 n.12. 
 201. Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REV. 637. 
In France, a juridical theory of secte [“cult” or “dangerous sect”] has been 
painstakingly elaborated after many years and through a constant flow of often 
passionate debates. This theory distinguishes sectes from religions; thus, the theory 
does not provide sectes with the same protection provided to religions by 
international texts. 
Id. at 647. Professor Robert notes that in France, “there remains a de facto regime of 
‘recognized religions’ consisting of the Catholic Church, the Reformed Church, the Lutheran 
Church, and the Jewish religion,” and that any other religions “are simply ‘tolerated’ and do 
not enjoy ‘official status.’” Id. at 647 n.23. 
 202. Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REV. 643, 650–51 
(discussing the struggle of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the German courts to gain the status of a 
public corporation). 
 203. Adelbert Denaux, The Attitude of Belgian Authorities Toward New Religious 
Movements, 2002 BYU L. REV. 237, 240 (arguing that the appearance of 189 religious 
organizations—“new religious movements”—on an official list of the Information and Advice 
Center Concerning Harmful Sectarian Organizations in no way implied that groups included 
in the list were “harmful” or “sectarian”). 
 204. J. Brian Gross, Comment, Russia’s War on Religious and Political Extremism: An 
Appraisal of the Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,” 2003 BYU L. REV. 717, 737–58 
(analyzing the broad potential for abuse in Russia’s new Extremism Law and comparing it to 
the heavy-handed approach taken to religion in other related laws in Russia in the mid and late 
1990s). 
 205. See KAGAN, supra note 46, at 5, 37. 
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crimes. But still, the fact that some NGOs so openly express their 
intent to use the ICC to promote changes in national laws in their 
respective countries emphasizes the ICC’s capacity for judicial 
legislation, which would constitute a far greater constitutional 
obstacle than vague—but changeable—language in the ICC Statute. 
B. Analyzing the “Democratic Deficit” in the  
Structure and Function of the ICC 
From a U.S. perspective, the institutional structure of the ICC 
and the ICC’s substantive decision-making power combine to form a 
countermajoritarian difficulty that is perceived as an infringement of 
American constitutional principles. But through the Supreme 
Court’s well-established tradition of judicial review, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty already raises constitutional concerns 
from within the United States. Despite these concerns, judicial 
review is grudgingly accepted since it has been part of the U.S. 
structure of ordered liberty for more than two hundred years. But 
the appearance of the countermajoritarian difficulty in the ICC 
enjoys far less tolerance in the United States. 
1. Structural implications of the “democratic deficit” 
Some of the most cogent U.S. objections to the ICC revolve 
around the practical results implicit in the structure of the ICC, the 
relationship of the world’s inhabitants to the ICC, and in the types 
of decisions that the ICC will be institutionally suited to make. 
Under this structural argument,206 critics of the ICC universally decry 
the fact that the ICC “circumvent[s] the authority of the Security 
Council,”207 which, until the ICC Statute, had the sole responsibility 
to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and . . . [to] decide what measures shall 
be taken.”208 Because all of the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction 
also fall within the Security Council’s jurisdiction, the United States 
 206. See, e.g., Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 390–91 (“Underlying all these 
objections is the claim that the ICC structure is less democratic, and so less independent, than 
U.S. domestic political and judicial institutions.”). 
 207. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams). 
 208. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
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argued for a “Security Council-controlled Court,”209 which would 
only have jurisdiction over matters referred to it by the Security 
Council. This prior review would allow any permanent member of 
the Security Council to veto the recommended criminal prosecution. 
But because the ICC was intentionally created as a body 
independent of the United Nations, this idea did not become reality. 
The Security Council still plays a role in safeguarding against 
politically motivated prosecutions through the option to halt an 
investigation, but in this case the U.S. veto does not work to its 
advantage because “revoking an indictment is subject to the veto of 
any permanent Security Council member.”210
As a body outside the control of the U.N., the ICC manifests a 
democratic deficit in its structure. “The ICC’s principal difficulty is 
that its components do not fit into a coherent ‘constitutional’ 
structure that clearly delineates how laws are made, adjudicated and 
enforced, subject to popular accountability and structured to protect 
liberty. Instead, the Court and the Prosecutor are simply ‘out there’ 
in the international system . . . .”211 Without being embedded in a 
more distinct “constitutional structure” that provides ascertainable 
accountability, and in light of the capability of any state party or the 
prosecutor propio motu to initiate an investigation, the ICC will be in 
the perfect position to make policy by the very nature of its 
institutional framework. “So the argument runs, the ICC will make a 
number of very broad judgments, not just narrow and technical 
ones.”212 At this point the structural argument spills over into the 
prudential argument against the ICC. 
2. Prudential implications of the “democratic deficit” 
The prudential argument highlights a different type of 
democratic deficit in the way the court functions that would seem to 
render the ICC institutionally unsuited to adjudicate because of the 
certainty that judicial legislation or policymaking will result from its 
actions. The ICC Statute provides for an Assembly of States Parties 
 209. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 73 (prepared statement of Michael P. 
Scharf). 
 210. See Kissinger, supra note 167, at 94. 
 211. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 58 (prepared statement of Hon. John R. 
Bolton). 
 212. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. 
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in which each state party has one vote for electing213 and removing214 
the eighteen judges on the court and the prosecutor.215 The judges 
must be qualified as “persons of high moral character, impartiality 
and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their 
respective states for appointment to the highest judicial offices.”216 In 
this context, the idea of democratic deficit applies not to the 
selection process of the judges, which is democratic,217 but rather to 
the nature of the states voting on the judges and the prosecutor: 
“nondemocratic governments could control the personnel and 
activities of the ICC.”218 That is, “the judges will not be confined to 
those from democratic countries with rule of law.”219 Because of the 
perceived democratic deficit in the identity of its judges, under this 
prudential argument, the ICC will not be institutionally suited to 
make decisions that are likely to set policy in democratic states with 
the rule of law. This is particularly the case because of how even the 
safeguard of “complementarity with teeth” could function as an 
“international supremacy clause”: 
Rather than protecting national sovereignty and local democratic 
self-determination, the concept [of “complementarity”] operates 
much like an international supremacy clause. In essence, it is a 
back-hand way of asserting that the ICC’s rules govern. Whenever 
a nation departs from an ICC ruling, it will be found unwilling or 
unable to follow ICC law, thereby triggering complementary 
jurisdiction.220
 213. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 36(6)(a). 
 214. Id. at art. 46(2)(a). 
 215. Id. at arts. 42(4), 46(2)(b). 
 216. Id. at art. 36(3)(a). 
 217. Stated succinctly, the judges “are elected to single nonrenewable nine-year terms by 
a majority [two-thirds] vote of state parties. The judges selected are to represent the ‘principal 
legal systems of the world’ with no two being from the same state.” Bardavid, supra note 34, 
at 22. But see Nye, supra note 42, at 4 (“But who are ‘we the people’ in a world where political 
identity at the global level is so weak? ‘One state, one vote’ is not democratic.”). 
 218. Amann & Sellers, supra note 29, at 388. 
 219. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 3 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams). 
 220. Wilkins, supra note 20, at 272–73; see also ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 
19 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer). Scheffer notes: 
There are provisions in this treaty that would require governments to change their 
national laws in order to comply with the provisions of this treaty, particularly with 
respect to the surrender or transfer of individuals on their territory to the treaty. 
There would have to be changes in certain national laws to facilitate that and the 
implementing legislation. 
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In this sense, the ICC Statute demands identification of national laws 
with its definitions of the three crimes under its jurisdiction in order 
to take full advantage of the principle of complementarity. 
Essentially, this exemplifies the countermajoritarian difficulty of the 
ICC because the judges, as a product of the structural and prudential 
democratic deficit, will have this capacity to effect changes in the 
laws of the states themselves, thus exercising a certain degree of 
power over the states’ democratically elected legislatures. 
3. Facing America’s real problem with the ICC: The 
countermajoritarian difficulty 
Undoubtedly, the institutional nature of the ICC as outside the 
exclusive control of the Security Council will allow it to make policy 
in some respects by virtue of its independence. Furthermore, the 
notion of complementarity implies that judges, including those who 
have been elected from “nondemocratic states,” will be able to 
influence social policy within the states parties themselves. Together, 
the structural argument and the prudential argument illuminate the 
countermajoritarian difficulty of the ICC. 
However, the ICC provides safeguards against the adverse effects 
of this countermajoritarian factor while also striving to empower the 
two most positive aspects of such countermajoritarianism. These two 
factors are stability and principled decision making (i.e., making 
decisions in the interest of long-term considerations, rather than for 
the immediate end of getting re-elected), which also render federal 
courts institutionally suited to adjudicate in U.S. judicial review 
jurisprudence. For example, the ICC Statute greatly inhibits 
politically motivated prosecutions, one of the biggest fears arising 
out of the structural argument’s concern with the prosecutor’s propio 
motu powers,221 in at least two ways. First, a prosecutor must submit 
a proposal for any investigation to the judges of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber who may by majority vote stop the investigation if they 
find a lack of genuine substance.222 Second, there is accountability in 
ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 19 (statement of Hon. David J. Scheffer).  
 221. See generally Mumford, supra note 35, at 174–80. 
 222. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 15(4). In the Senate hearings, Professor Scharf 
expatiated on these safeguards: 
  Let us say that the United States does something very controversial. It decides 
to invade another country. The rest of the world does not think that that was in self-
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the structure of the ICC: “the prosecutor and judges of the ICC do 
answer to the assembly of states parties, which elected them.”223 The 
ICC Statute also protects the independence of the judges, 
prohibiting any kind of undue influence in their activities.224 Indeed, 
[t]he court is sufficiently independent. The judges and prosecutors 
are elected from amongst the party states to non-renewable 
terms—thus they are insulated from the politics of re-election. The 
Security Council, outside of the crime of aggression, cannot hinder 
the operation of the court (except upon unanimous vote where 
they can temporarily block prosecution). These are significant 
guarantees that, at least on paper, the court can remain sufficiently 
isolated from political pressures.225
These protections do not erase the countermajoritarian difficulty 
inherent in the activity of the ICC, but they do render it less 
constitutionally dangerous to the United States as a state party. 
The mere existence of a countermajoritarian difficulty in the ICC 
need not be a constitutional impediment to U.S. ratification. As 
shown by the Supreme Court’s method of enforcing the 
fundamental purpose of the U.S. Bill of Rights—the protection of 
the minority from majority tyranny—through its tradition of 
defense and decides to indict our Secretary of Defense or even our President. What 
would happen under that scenario? 
  Well, what would happen is at the first level, the United States would say this is 
not part of the Court’s jurisdiction because this is not a serious war crime, and if the 
prosecutor does his or her job, they will decide, no, this is not what the Court was 
about. This is not a serious war crime. This is not of the level of genocide. This is a 
peacekeeping effort. This is something that is appropriate. But we cannot trust the 
prosecutor to do his job. You do not know. 
  So, then the prosecutor has to go to the three-judge panel, and you hope that 
two of those judges will see the light. But if they do not, then you have to go to the 
full panel of all of the judges. During this time period, the United States can stop it 
in other ways. If we do our own investigation like a Lieutenant Calley, what if our 
Secretary of Defense was doing a rogue operation? We could investigate and we 
could decide to prosecute, in which case it turns off the Court, or we could decide 
that there is no grounds for prosecution, but that we made that decision in good 
faith, which also turns off the Court and that decision is appealable. 
  Finally, we can go to our friends on the Security Council and say, look, you do 
not want your leaders to be brought before the Court. Join us in voting to turn off 
the Court. The five permanent members are very likely to join us, and if we can get 
four out of the other nine members to do so, then the Security Council can stop. 
ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 40 (statement by Michael P. Scharf). 
 223. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. 
 224. Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 40. 
 225. Bardavid, supra note 34, at 27. 
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countermajoritarian judicial review,226 “legitimacy can come from 
other than majority rule.”227 “This argument,” proceeds Professor 
Forsythe, “is based in part on the observation that all liberal 
democracies restrain majority rule by independent courts with 
appointed judges for the precise intent of protecting human rights 
from the tyranny of the majority.”228 And as an outsider to the ICC, 
the United States will not be able to make use of the democratic 
processes set up in the ICC for making amendments to provisions 
deemed problematic from the U.S. perspective. This point is 
particularly germane to the U.S. concern about the democratic 
deficit in the identity of the ICC’s judges and how that affects the 
ICC’s institutional penchant for judicial legislation on social policy 
concerning the crimes under its jurisdiction. 
Only as a State Party would the United States be entitled to 
nominate candidates for ICC judges and vote for [or against] the 
election of all judges. Only nationals of States Parties may be 
elected judges, so a U.S. national, in most cases, could only 
become a judge if the United States is a State Party. Only as a State 
Party would the United States be entitled to vote for the 
Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors.229
Finally, even taking for granted the democratic deficit inherent in 
the structure and function of the ICC, the countermajoritarian 
difficulty that naturally results does not necessarily render the 
institution itself fundamentally undemocratic.230 Despite the 
countermajoritarian aspects of the ICC, it surely still “operates under 
public scrutiny and criticism—but not at all times or in all parts [at 
once]. What we mean by democracy, therefore, is much more 
sophisticated and complex than the making of decisions in town 
meeting by a show of hands.”231 “Democracy,” in this broader sense, 
demands active participation to be successful for the individual. 
 226. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 227. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of how the 
countermajoritarian difficulty is more of an integral part of the republican U.S. system of 
government than deviant to it. 
 228. Forsythe, supra note 16, at 986. 
 229. Scheffer, supra note 176, at 97. 
 230. See supra Part II.B. 
 231. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 17. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The ICC aims to bring those who commit genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity to justice. In response to those praising 
the ICC as a deterrent to these crimes by ending impunity, some 
doubt the efficacy of the ICC’s de facto universal jurisdiction as a 
deterrent to these crimes.232 But significantly, “this [deterrent] effect 
should not be overstated. . . . The key rationale for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, therefore, is not deterrence but justice.”233 This 
rationale applies with equal force to ATCA litigation,234 in which 
U.S. courts have been allowing individuals to seek justice through 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction over aliens since 1980. The 
result has been a “plaintiff’s diplomacy” that contradicts the U.S. 
stance against the ICC. Whereas the countermajoritarian difficulty 
inherent in the ICC is centralized and applies to all nations that 
consent to its jurisprudence through ratification of the ICC Statute, 
U.S. ATCA litigation subjects aliens of nations that have not 
subscribed to U.S. law to federal subject matter jurisdiction based on 
universal jurisdiction attached to certain violations of customary 
international law. U.S. economic and military might has contributed 
to ATCA litigation’s capacity to dictate political and social policy in 
these countries, and such dominance will also perpetuate the 
asymmetry between the exportation of U.S. law in ATCA litigation 
and the U.S. rejection of the ICC. 
In the end, even the countermajoritarian difficulty of the ICC—
America’s real problem with the ICC—does not strictly prohibit 
U.S. participation in that body; rather, the nature of the real world, 
or the way the United States views the world, precludes U.S. 
submission to the ICC at the present time. America has been living 
in the harsh, Hobbesian world where Realpolitik reigns and where 
since 1945 “international law regarding peace and security is largely 
whatever the Security Council says that it is.”235 In this world, the 
“mass murderers and ethnic cleansers [in this century] . . . got away 
 232. See ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 50 (prepared statement of Hon. John R. 
Bolton) (arguing that “the deterrence argument has no empirical foundation”); Wilkins, supra 
note 20, at 278 (suggesting that arguments for deterrence only have force in an “ideal utopian 
world”). 
 233. Kamminga, supra note 79, at 943–44. 
 234. See supra Part III.B.1–2 for a discussion of the ATCA’s goal of prevention 
alongside, or perhaps even above and beyond, recovery of damages. 
 235. ICC Hearings (1998), supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Sen. Rod Grams). 
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with their crimes because no one dispatched soldiers to challenge 
them, not because there were no lawyers dispatched to indict them. 
Prosecutors do not deter evil. Armies do.”236 Everyone is a threat; 
power is a zero-sum game; one cannot trust a neighbor to follow 
one’s lead in retiring the “big stick.” 
Saddam Hussein’s evasion of the conditions in the Security 
Council Resolutions that ended the Gulf War in 1991 illustrates the 
weakness of unenforceable international law. Hussein neither 
respected international law nor feared prosecution in the ICC, as 
reflected by his ousting of the weapons inspectors and subversive 
actions in developing weapons of mass destruction. The success 
France claimed in influencing Hussein to destroy a few token missiles 
in the campaign to seek a peaceful disarmament—the original 
condition for cessation of conflict in the Gulf War of 1991—in the 
weeks preceding the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 more likely 
derived from the threat of U.S. troops amassing on Hussein’s 
border, than from a mutual submission to international law.  
Given this American skepticism of the force of international law, 
it is not surprising that the United States continues to reject the ICC 
while European countries have largely embraced it. This 
constellation might be explained as a function of power: 
Europe’s relative weakness has understandably produced a powerful 
European interest in building a world where military strength and 
hard power matter less than economic and soft power, an 
international order where international law and international 
institutions matter more than the power of individual nations. . . . 
Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually 
eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic Hobbesian world where 
power is the ultimate determinant of national security and 
success.237
The United States, on the other hand, still values military 
strength and hard power in deterring despots and human rights 
abusers. The Hitlers, Stalins, Pol Pots, Pinochets, Osama bin Ladens, 
and Saddam Husseins of the world do not fear a potential 
prosecution in the ICC—where torture or even the death penalty 
would be unthinkable as a just desert—for the atrocities they inflict. 
 236. Mumford, supra note 35, at 171 (alterations in original) (quoting Editorial, 
Courting Disaster, NEW REPUBLIC, July 13, 1998, at 7). 
 237. KAGAN, supra note 46, at 37. 
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But they might think twice if 250,000 U.S. and Coalition troops are 
amassed on their borders. This nature of things is an indictment on 
the “Hobbesian” world, and not necessarily on the United States for 
being an “arrogant superpower” TP238 PT in seeking to protect itself from 
what it sees as yet another threat—the new ICC. But even if 
international law successfully “eradicat[ed] the brutal laws of an 
anarchic Hobbesian world,”TP239 PT U.S. ATCA litigation would still be 
inconsistent with U.S. constitutional concerns about the ICC. 
Specifically, “[r]ulings by U.S. courts [through ATCA litigation] 
cannot substitute for the hard work of reaching consensus within 
foreign states on respect for human rights and responsible 
development.”TP240 PT This type of judicial legislation in foreign countries 
engaged in by U.S. judges through ATCA litigation compounds the 
countermajoritarian difficulty by preempting the responsibility of 
foreign legislatures more institutionally suited to make those kinds of 
decisions. Still, U.S. ATCA litigation might not be as problematic or 
intrusive for other countries if the United States were a state party to 
the ICC Statute. In that case, the United States would consent 
together with the other states parties to the jurisdiction of the ICC—
a central body with the same relationship to all states parties—over 
substantially the same crimes that form the basis of ATCA suits in 
the United States. Then the world might simply view the United 
States as providing a civil remedy for crimes that are subject to 
criminal attention in the ICC, rather than as an imperial superpower 
setting up “supercourts” of its own while shunning the real world 
courts. 
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